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ABSTRACT 
 This report describes equipping medium-sized unmanned surface vehicles and 
integrating them with surface action groups to improve defense against anti-ship cruise 
missile threats. Requirements for air search radar, electronic warfare, soft-kill deception 
countermeasure, surface-to-air missile, and close-in weapons systems are generated and 
allocated to physical components. Requirements for supporting subsystems, such as an 
integrated combat system and communications, electrical power, cooling, hydraulics, 
positioning, navigation, and timing systems, are also identified. The unmanned surface 
vehicle’s ability to extend sensor and weapons coverage for the surface action group is 
explored via modeling and simulation. The report presents quantitative analysis that 
employing unmanned surface vehicles equipped with systems to detect anti-ship cruise 
missile threats and soft-kill and hard-kill threat response options offers surface action 
groups a defensive advantage against those threats. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Adversaries continue to develop anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) threats. Medium-
sized unmanned surface vessels (USVs) equipped with sensors to detect and systems to 
respond to ASCM threats could be used as added protection for manned surface units, 
including surface action groups (SAGs). This study identifies requirements for USVs 
defending SAGs in such a manner, selects relevant ASCM detection and response 
subsystems, and assesses the feasibility of medium-sized USVs in this ASCM defense role. 
Outputs from this study could be used to inform future medium-sized USV system designs 
and concepts of operation. 
This study applies system engineering processes to meet the following study goals:  
1. Determine functional requirements for ASCM detection and response 
subsystems onboard a future USV host platform 
2. Identify real world subsystems that address those requirements 
3. Identify required communications between USVs and SAG units in the 
ASCM defense scenario 
4. Identify subsystems that meet communications requirements 
5. Assess tactical utility of USVs employed in a SAG ASCM defense role 
6. Assess effectiveness of potential USV formations within a SAG 
Creation of a design reference mission describes the operational context, formalizes 
the concept of operations, and identifies ASCM threats that could reasonably be employed 
against units in a SAG. The following mission requirements define successful USV 
integration in the ASCM defense role: 
1. USV use shall mitigate the probability of ASCM hit on SAG ships by 
defeating threats via kinetic or non-kinetic means. 
xviii 
2. USV use shall provide early warning and threat cueing to SAG ships, 
thereby increasing available reaction time and counter-fire opportunities of 
SAG ships from initial threat detection compared to a no-USV scenario. 
3. ASCM detection and response subsystems on the USV host platform must 
not require the USV to be larger than medium sized. 
The scenarios consider defense of a SAG in an open ocean environment in 
conditions of a sea state of four or less. Three modern missile threats, operating at 
supersonic and subsonic speeds, are identified as high, medium, and low threats to the 
SAG. The Russian 3M-54 or SS-N-27 Sizzler is the high threat, the Chinese YJ-83 or 
CSS-N-8 Saccade is the medium threat, and the Chinese C-704 is the low threat. Four 
operational scenarios are studied, two in which the USV detects and engages the threat and 
two in which the USV makes detection and cues the SAG to engage the threat. The ASCM 
launch platform is not a consideration in this study since initial detections are assumed to 
occur when the missile is already in flight with no prior cueing to the SAG or USV. 
USV ASCM detection subsystems are air search radar and electronic support 
systems. Response subsystems are soft-kill deception countermeasures, surface-to-air 
missiles, a close-in weapons system, and electronic attack systems. An integrated combat 
system is required to translate and pass tactical data between the USV subsystems and units 
in the SAG. Requirements for the subsystems to be integrated are defined, and potential 
subsystems are evaluated against requirement criteria using publicly available data. Size, 
weight, power, interoperability, and compatibility concerns, along with additional 
communications requirements, are evaluated to ensure the design is feasible. The best fit 
subsystems are selected for inclusion into a notional prototype system. 
The best fit detection subsystems selected are: 
1. Enterprise Air Search Radar Variant 2 
2. Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program Block 3 
 
xix 
The best fit response subsystems selected are: 
1. Centurion countermeasure launcher 
2. Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block 2 launched by Mk 29 Guided Missile 
Launching System 
3. Phalanx Close-in Weapons System 
4. Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program Block 3 
Potential communications systems include very-high frequency and ultra-high 
frequency radios, tactical data links, and Cooperative Engagement Capability. Line of sight 
methods between the USV and SAG are preferred when possible. 
A Markov kill chain model uses data from the previous steps of the process to assess 
the tactical utility of a USV employed in the SAG ASCM defense role. This model, 
developed in Microsoft Excel, uses a chain of intermediate states and associated 
probabilities for each state transition to determine success rates for USV engagements 
against incoming ASCM threats. Assessments of an incoming threat flying directly 
overhead of the USV and a threat incoming off axis, closer to the maximum USV detection 
range, are performed to determine relative success of USV engagements in the scenario. 
Results from these two situations show that utilization of the USV as a weapon platform 
can significantly mitigate the probability of ASCM hits on SAG units. 
The utility of the USV as an early warning sensor for cueing SAG counter-fire is 
explored using a time-distance analysis model created in Microsoft Excel. This model 
assesses variations of a single USV placed directly on the incoming missile threat axis and 
off axis such that the inbound threat is identified tangential to its maximum detection 
radius. These scenarios represent the maximum and minimum benefits for early warning 
detection times. Assessments for each threat missile are conducted, and the relationships 
between the USV and SAG detection range rings as a function of radar antenna height and 
USV-SAG spacing are explored. The early detection times for high, medium, and low 
threat missiles are then translated into SAG counter-fire shot opportunities. Results of this 
xx 
analysis show there is clear benefit in utilization of the USV as an early warning platform 
to cue SAG units to engage incoming threat missiles. 
Finally, tradeoffs associated with different USV formations around the SAG are 
explored using a graphical tool created in Microsoft Excel from Visual Basic for 
Applications coding. The tool places all the SAG units in a single position and accounts 
for relative USV-SAG spacing, detection range rings for threat missiles derived from USV 
and SAG antenna heights, and inter-USV spacing. The measures of interest are degrees of 
coverage in terms of the USV detection screen and total linear distance between the USVs 
and SAG. The total linear distance correlates to early warning time available for SAG units 
to respond. Two basic formations are evaluated: a linear screen where USVs form a line 
perpendicular to a given threat access and a radial formation around the SAG, with USVs 
spaced evenly. The analysis shows that as the number of USVs increases, the radial 
formation provides the most degrees of coverage. The linear formation, however, presents 
an advantage in the total linear distance and corresponding early warning detection times. 
Tradeoffs in these measures will have to be considered when deciding on USV stationing. 
This study presents quantitative analysis that employing a USV equipped with 
systems to detect ASCM threats and soft-kill and hard-kill response options offers a SAG 
a defensive advantage against those threats. The USV is able to defeat a significant portion 
of inbound threats as well as offer early warning to SAG units, affording those units more 
counter-fire opportunities when compared to a scenario without the USV. 
Additional studies are recommended and could include additional analysis on USV 
placement and stationing respective to SAG units, organization and design of subsystems 
onboard the USV, kill chain analysis of multiple USVs, the potential for reduced subsystem 
electrical loads, and the associated determination of electrical power generation 
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A. UNMANNED SYSTEMS BACKGROUND 
1. Unmanned Vehicles in the Military 
Unmanned aerial, underwater, and surface vehicles allow the military to perform 
tasks that manned vehicles can accomplish with less risk to military personnel, provide 
force multiplication in order to accomplish assigned missions, and reduce costs relative to 
manned methods. Keane and Carr (2013) describe how current technologies—including 
GPS and live video feed—enable pilots to remotely control unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) like the Predator and Global Hawk from thousands of miles away to perform 
advanced operations. Blidberg (2001) asserts that unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) 
have taken a large role in the United States Navy (USN) and are now considered primary 
workhorses of mine hunting and clearing operations as well as bathymetry and sediment 
sampling operations. In 2007, the USN released the Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) 
Master Plan to guide “USV development to effectively meet the Navy’s strategic planning 
and Fleet objectives and the force transformation goals of the Department of Defense to 
the year 2020” (Department of the Navy 2007, x). This document defined the following 
seven USV mission areas in prioritized order: 
1. “Mine countermeasures (MCM) 
2. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
3. Maritime security (MS) 
4. Surface warfare (SUW) 
5. Special operations forces (SOF) support 
6. Electronic warfare (EW) 
7. Maritime interdiction operations (MIO) support” (Department of the Navy 
2007, xi). 
2 
2. Recent Unmanned Surface Vehicle Efforts 
The USN collectively designates UUVs and USVs as unmanned maritime systems 
(UMS). The Navy’s UMS efforts are led by the UMS Program Office—PMS 406—within 
the Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC), formerly 
PEO for Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW). PMS 406 is chartered to “develop, 
acquire, deliver, and support operationally effective, integrated” UMS and to “direct UMS 
experimentation and technology maturation efforts to meet the Fleet’s capability needs” 
(PEO LMW 2011, 1). To that end, PMS 406 maintains the USV system vision as presented 
in Figure 1. The vision shows the current Sea Hunter and Ghost Fleet USV efforts building 
into the mid-term to long-term goal of the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) USV. The 
stakeholder entities are shown across the bottom. 
 
Figure 1.  USV System Vision. Adapted from Rucker (2018). 
In 2010, to address the 2007 USV Master Plan’s ASW mission area, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated the ASW Continuous Trail 
Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) effort, which later became Sea Hunter and the medium 
displacement USV (MDUSV) when the program transitioned to the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) in 2018 (DARPA 2018). It utilizes a trimaran hull and implements an 
autonomous navigation system that conforms to the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) as well as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, autonomous ASW sensors and systems are 
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onboard. Additional systems including DARPA’s Towed Airborne Lift of Naval Systems 
(TALONS) project and various MCM payloads have been tested in conjunction with 
ACTUV sea trials, and they will continue to be tested on Sea Hunter (DARPA 2018). Sea 
Hunter is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Sea Hunter. Source: Williams (2016). 
The Ghost Fleet effort was initiated by the Secretary of Defense’s Strategic 
Capabilities Office (SCO) in 2017. Like other SCO efforts, Ghost Fleet is a rapid 
prototyping effort meant to demonstrate new game-changing capability within five years 
and serve as a risk mitigator to transition the new capability to the appropriate service 
branch—in this case the USN and PMS 406 (Department of Defense 2018). The surface 
component of this effort is referred to as Overlord, and it is working to “convert larger, 
existing, manned ships into USVs over the next 3 years so that they can conduct existing 
missions now undertaken by manned warships” (Berkoff 2018, 38). 
The FSC USV effort also originated in 2017 and is led by OPNAV N96—the 
Navy’s director for surface warfare (Eckstein 2018). An August 28, 2018, article from the 
U.S. Naval Institute webpage describes the FSC goal to develop a mixed ship force 
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structure including a large combatant similar to a destroyer, a small combatant like the 
littoral combat ship or the next generation frigate, and a large-sized and medium-sized 
USV, all with “an integrated combat system that will be the common thread linking all the 
platforms” (Eckstein 2018, 1). 
While the Sea Hunter and Ghost Fleet efforts will be of great utility in the design 
of the yet-undefined hull form and specific capabilities of the FSC USV, additional studies 
are prudent. PMS 406 has specified the following mission areas as FSC USV areas of 
interest: armed escort, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), EW, UUV 
launch, communications relay, ASW tracking and engagement, mining and MCM, and 
counter-swarm against threat boat or airborne swarms (Rucker 2018). This study seeks to 
address the armed escort, ISR, EW, and communications relay areas of interest for the 
future medium-sized USV. 
3. Surface Ship Missile Defense 
Adversaries continue to improve their anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) designs. 
These missiles range in capability from subsonic to hypersonic speeds and can be launched 
from land, sea (surface and subsurface), or aerial platforms. They represent a high threat 
from an aggressive force due to their speed and ability to exploit radar blind spots. 
Additionally, the U.S. and near-peer forces have developed these weapons since the early 
1940s, so they are ubiquitous today. 
As USVs are introduced and operate with USN and partner nation naval forces, 
they will be expected to play a role in increasing situational awareness for commanders. 
This would involve increasing the detection range of threats—such as ASCMs—from 
manned units beyond those units’ organic capabilities. USVs could also defend both 
manned units and themselves from inbound ASCMs. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Adversary ASCM threats continue to evolve and present new dangers to USN ships 
and sailors. Methods of ASCM detection and response must evolve in parallel to pace and 
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overcome the threat. One area for exploration is the use of USVs to augment and 
complement the defense of a surface action group (SAG) against ASCM threats. 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The focus of this study is two-fold. First, it seeks to provide notional medium-sized 
USV host platform system engineering level requirements for ASCM detection and 
response subsystems. Medium-sized USVs are defined by the USN as having a length 
between 12 and 50 meters (LaGrone 2019). Focusing on the higher end of the length range, 
it is expected a medium-sized USV will have a maximum displacement 300 long tons, a 
maximum width of approximately 7.5 meters, a draft of two meters, and a maximum height 
above the waterline of approximately 15 meters. These values were determined by 
comparison against the Cyclone class patrol craft measurements, whose overall length is 
51.8 meters (Pike 2011b). 
Detection subsystems in this study are defined as those that perform find, fix, and 
track functions against ASCM threats in the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess 
(F2T2EA) kill chain. This study focuses on air search radar and electronic support (ES) 
detection systems. Response systems are those that can target and engage via either kinetic 
or non-kinetic means such as counter-fire, soft-kill deception countermeasures, or 
electronic attack (EA). 
The second focus of this study is to assess whether a notional medium-sized USV 
equipped with the prescribed real-world systems could be effective in the defense of a SAG 
against ASCM threats. This part of the study leverages operational analysis approaches to 
determine utility of the USV in given scenarios and involves analysis of communications 
paths and corresponding communications systems. 
The ideas are investigated by simulating the use of USVs to increase detection 
range of inbound ASCM threats relative to the protected units and employ both soft-kill 
and hard-kill defensive countermeasures. Concepts studied would be applicable in high 
value unit (HVU) defense as well. 
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D. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
This analysis relies on three key assumptions. The first assumption—and perhaps 
the most critical—is that the USVs will be able to maintain station with the SAG, meaning 
all support needs like fuel and maintenance are met by ships in company or exceeded by 
the performance parameters of the USV itself and will therefore not be considered in this 
analysis. Second, it is assumed any Afloat Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Program 
(AESOP) issues will be effectively de-conflicted. Effective management of the 
electromagnetic spectrum is important to prevent mutual interference, which would inhibit 
or restrict performance of sensors and equipment. Finally, safe recovery of the USV is 
assumed to be achievable in case of loss of control. Normally, the SAG commander would 
control the USVs remotely to coordinate changes in station and tactical responses to enemy 
actions. The third assumption is that in the event control of the USV cannot be maintained, 
communications will be reestablished quickly, or another unit will be able to tow the USV 
to an intermediate maintenance facility for repair. 
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
1. Overview of Approach 
The systems engineering process used in this study begins with an operational 
analysis. After threats and mission scenarios are identified via a design reference mission 
(DRM), system requirements are generated. The system design phase then identifies 
recommended ASCM detection and response subsystems and associated size, weight, and 
power (SWaP) requirements. Additional communications requirements are then evaluated 
based on selected subsystem and operational requirements. These are used to finalize the 
proposed USV configuration and required communications pathways. Finally, this 
configuration is used in simulations of the threat scenarios to evaluate the utility for using 
USVs to aid in ASCM defense of the manned units. The complete systems engineering 
process is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  System Engineering Process for the Study
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2. Detailed Description of Approach 
During the operational analysis phase, a DRM is developed to produce multiple 
scenarios where the USV is positioned differently relative to the rest of the SAG, projected 
operating environments, mission definitions, threats, and measures. Enemy threats 
identified in this phase help determine required countermeasures. Threats and mission 
definitions are used for requirements generation in the following phase. 
In the subsystem requirements generation phase, functional system requirements 
and baseline communications requirements for the USV detection and response subsystems 
are identified based on outputs from the DRM. Response systems are those that can defeat 
incoming ASCM threats (via soft-kill or hard-kill means). After this process, subsystem 
requirements are sent to the design phase. Once the engineering process is complete, these 
requirements become an output of the study as proposed host platform requirements. 
During the subsystem selection and architecting phase, current commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) detection and response subsystems 
are researched and compared, to include SWaP requirements of the potential 
subsystems. The subsystems most appropriate for use on a medium-sized USV are selected, 
and system requirements are allocated to those components. A proposed physical 
architecture for the USV system is also identified, based on the chosen subsystems. These 
are collected as study deliverables for use in future USV platform design considerations. 
Any additional requirements identified during this phase are used as feedback to the system 
requirements phase. This includes ensuring selected systems are compatible with and do 
not interfere with each other (or interference is able to be deconflicted). The outputs of this 
phase are recommended detection and response subsystems with associated SWaP 
requirements. 
The fourth step in the process is to evaluate additional communications 
requirements. Based on the selected detection and response subsystems, the team identifies 
any derived communications requirements needed beyond the baseline requirements and 
assesses if they are viable. If the new communications requirements are not viable, the 
subsystem requirements are updated, and the team proposes how they could be 
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implemented by alternative future communications systems. The proposed USV 
configuration is sent to the next phase of this process. The outputs of this phase also include 
component driven communications requirements and the results of the communications 
path evaluation. 
The final phase of the process is to evaluate operational scenarios. An analysis of 
modeled scenarios is performed to determine the utility of the USV launching and emitting 
counter-fire effects in the ASCM defense mission, determine the tactical utility of the USV 
as a cueing platform for SAG organic defense, and to inform discussion on various USV 
geometries around the SAG. 
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II. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
A. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE 
This study utilizes the DRM process, described by Skolnick and Wilkins (2000) as 
characterizing the operating and threat environment in addition to defining requirements. 
It also serves as a baseline to support concept development, trade study analysis, design, 
and test and evaluation activities (Skolnick and Wilkins 2000). In this study, the DRM 
initial outputs are baseline operational assumptions and mission context. These initial 
outputs are then used to produce operational requirements and scenarios that lay the 
foundation for further systems analysis and systems engineering activities. 
This DRM has been conducted to support analysis of the feasibility of employing 
USVs in the defense of a SAG from enemy ASCMs. To protect the SAG, the USV is 
required to independently detect and counter inbound ASCM threats and cooperatively 
engage with the SAG. The USV will serve as a screening vessel to mitigate the probability 
of ASCM hits on SAG ships. This screening tactic is intended to provide the SAG 
additional reaction time versus ASCM threats by way of cueing and also affords the USV 
the chance to engage and remove the ASCM threat while it is inbound to the SAG. To 
operate cooperatively with the SAG, it is assumed the USV can achieve and maintain 
required speed to remain on station and will not have issues with on-station endurance. 
Cooperative engagement with SAG includes the ability of the SAG ships to execute 
traditional command and control of the USVs and execute counter ASCM measures based 
on USV cueing in a distributed lethality context. 
The DRM includes operational situations (OPSITS) that describe notional 
scenarios where the USV is defending a SAG from ASCM threats to serve as a basis for 
the analysis. The DRM highlights the importance of the USV’s detection and response 
subsystems in our OPSITs. Each of these subsystems must be able to interact with one 
another onboard the USV and pass information—including target tracks and subsystem 
health and status messages—back to systems and operators in the SAG. These USV 
subsystems must also be responsive to SAG command signals and remote control. 
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B. MISSION BACKGROUND 
Technological advancements in ASCMs make detecting and defeating them 
increasingly challenging. Advanced guidance systems enable ASCMs to hit targets with 
excellent accuracy, and various stealth methods are employed to limit detectability. 
ASCMs can be launched from surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and land-based 
platforms. Due to the diversity of the threat, ASCM defense options for friendly surface 
units must be continuously developed and improved. 
Analysis of ASCM effectiveness and corresponding ASCM defense effectiveness 
and methodologies is readily available. This study leverages and builds upon the kill-chain 
analysis framework of Smith (2010) because his research deals specifically with surface 
ship defense against ASCMs and the “formidable layered defense of a target ship to include 
hard kill and soft kill measures” (Smith 2010, v). 
Ship defense against ASCMs involves using EW or kinetic means to distract, jam, 
and destroy the threat. Specifically, countermeasures to ASCMs include both long-range 
and short-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), close-in weapons systems (CIWS), radio 
frequency jamming, electro-optical/infrared jamming, and use of deception such as decoys, 
flares, and chaff to seduce the missile away from its intended target (Smith 2010). 
C. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT AND PROJECTED ENVIRONMENT 
1. Scenario Overview 
This scenario encompasses a blue SAG supported by forward positioned USVs. 
The ships are operating in an open ocean environment with no impediments to 
maneuvering. Should an ASCM be launched at friendly units, maneuvering for unit self-
defense and self-preservation will be the priority over any territorial waters or politically 
sensitive area restrictions, so those are not a concern in the simulations. The ships will be 
steaming under a condition III watchbill, with no prior threat indications from intelligence 
sources. There are no environmental threat conditions, such as excessive winds or sea state. 
The environment is assumed to be communications permissive (communications are not 
degraded or denied). The SAG and USVs can communicate via line of sight (LOS) or 
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beyond line of sight (BLOS) communications systems. Friendly forces are equipped with 
both soft-kill and hard-kill countermeasures. 
Concentrating on an open ocean environment, an air or surface launched ASCM is 
most likely going to be utilizing over the horizon targeting. The ASCM threats are therefore 
assumed to have been launched from sanctuary and beyond SAG detection capabilities. 
Friendly forces will first identify threats on organic sensors onboard the USVs or the SAG 
ships. Given the short decision space and response times required in this scenario, the USV 
operations must be under control of the SAG and not dependent on outside operational 
control. 
Ideally, the USV will increase the range at which the threat ASCM is detected 
relative to the SAG, allowing the SAG to have more decision time and space to react from 
initial threat detection when compared to a scenario without the USV. The USV and SAG 
would be communicating as described above by LOS communications or BLOS 
communication via a communications relay. Both the SAG and USV will be able to 
respond to the threat with soft-kill and hard-kill options. This notional operational picture 
is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Notional Operational Picture 
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The specific scenario developed for use in the simulation for the low and medium 
threat ASCMs is as follows: a conflict over territorial rights in the South China Sea between 
naval forces from the People’s Republic of China and a U.S. ally has resulted in open 
conflict. A SAG and three medium-sized USVs have been sent from Yokosuka, Japan to 
the area of conflict. The SAG consists of one Ticonderoga class cruiser and two Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers. While in transit in unrestricted waters, at 0815 local time, the 
American units are intercepted by Chinese strike aircraft equipped with ASCMs. 
For the high threat ASCM, the scenario is as follows: a conflict over territorial 
rights in the Pacific Ocean between naval forces from the Russian Federation and a U.S. 
ally has resulted in open conflict. A SAG and three medium-sized USVs have been sent 
from Yokosuka, Japan to the area of conflict. The SAG consists of one Ticonderoga class 
cruiser and two Arleigh Burke class destroyers. While in transit in unrestricted waters, at 
0815 local time, the American units are intercepted by Russian strike aircraft equipped with 
ASCMs. 
2. Environmental Conditions 
For this study, attacks will be limited to the following environmental conditions, 
which were derived based on the normal operating conditions and operational limitations 
of shipboard equipment and personnel:  
1. Daytime 
2. Air temperature from 0–50 degrees C  
3. Water temperature from 2–35 degrees C  
4. No ice or snow  
5. Light or no precipitation 
6. Winds less than 30 knots 
7. Sea state correlating to no greater than 4 on the Beaufort Wind Force 
Scale (wave heights of 1–2 meters with occasional white caps) 
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8. Effects of currents and set and drift neglected (no significant effect on 
ship’s performance in a tactical situation, given the described scenario and 
environment) 
9. No excessive haze or dust that could limit communications capabilities 
10. No other communications limitations (all pathways available) 
3. Threat Details 
Three adversary ASCMs have been selected for this analysis and categorized into 
threat levels of low, medium, and high. Threat baselines were determined by analyzing 
missile speed, payload, and range. The threats were selected based on missile operational 
history, capabilities, and operators (these weapons could also be launched from a different 
country given weapons proliferation). 
The Chinese C-704 is identified as the low threat. It is subsonic and can be launched 
from ships or aircraft (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018c, 2018d). The Chinese YJ-83 (also 
known as the CSS-N-8 Saccade) is identified as the medium threat. It is subsonic and can 
be launched from ships, ground units, or aircraft (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018f, 2018h). The 
Russian 3M-54 (also known as the SS-N-27 Sizzler) is identified as the high threat. It can 
be launched from submarines, ships, or aircraft, depending on the variant (Jane’s by IHS 
Markit 2018e). This missile is subsonic while in the cruise phase, and then deploys a 
terminal supersonic missile to attack its target (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018a). Figures 5 
through 7 display the selected ASCMs. The threat missiles have a wide variety of 
maximum ranges, from 38 to 660 kilometers, and the warheads range from 130 to 400 
kilograms of high explosive (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018a, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 
2018h). Table 1 displays the characteristics of the ASCMs. 
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Figure 5.  Low Threat: C-704. Source: Hewson (2010). 
 
Figure 6.  Medium Threat: YJ-83 and Export Variant. Source: Carlson 
(2013). 
 
Figure 7.  High Threat: 3M-54. Source: Kopp (2012). 
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Table 1.   Threat Missile Characteristics. Adapted from Jane’s by IHS 
Markit (2018a, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018h). 
Missile C-704 CSS-N-8 Saccade; YJ-83 
SS-N-27 Sizzler; 
3M-54 
Threat Low Medium High 
Country of 
Origin China China Russia 
Launch 
Vehicle 
Ship,               
Air(C-704KD) 





Range 38km;                            50km (air-launch) 
180km;                            
200km (air-launch) 
220-275km;                            
300km (air-launch);           
660 km(submarine 
launch) 
Speed Subsonic;         Mach 0.875 
Subsonic;        
Mach 0.9 
Supersonic;     
Mach 0.8 (cruise);  
Mach 2.9 (terminal) 
Seeker Type 
NATO K band 
active homing;   
dual band IR 
(air launch) 
NATO I band 
active homing 
active homing 
(band not specified) 
Warhead 130 kg high explosive 
165 kg high 
explosive 




Note: Data displayed in this table was gathered from various pages on https://janes.ihs.com as 
accessed through the Naval Postgraduate School login (https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu).  
 
D. MISSION AND MEASURES 
1. Mission Success Requirements 
Three high level operational and host platform design requirements that form the 
basis for the detection and response subsystem requirements were identified: 
1. USV use shall mitigate the probability of ASCM hit on SAG ships by 
defeating threats via kinetic or non-kinetic means. 
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2. USV use shall provide early warning and threat cueing to SAG ships, 
thereby increasing available reaction time and counter-fire opportunities of 
SAG ships from initial threat detection compared to a no-USV scenario. 
3. ASCM detection and response subsystems on the USV host platform must 
not require the USV to be larger than medium sized. 
Based on these mission requirements, three scenarios were identified where USV 
integration with SAGs would be considered successful: all three requirements met, 
requirements 1 and 3 met, or requirements 2 and 3 met. Thus, the USV must remain 
medium sized in all scenarios. Further, the USV must defeat inbound ASCM threats or 
provide early warning and threat cueing to the SAG, or both. 
2. OPSIT Definitions 
The OPSITs describe notional scenarios where the USV is defending a SAG from 
ASCM threats. For the low and medium threat scenarios, the Chinese strike force 
consisting of eight aircraft armed with C-704s and YJ-83s approaches the SAG and 
launches their missiles. For the high threat scenario, the Russian strike force consisting of 
eight aircraft armed with 3M-54s approaches the SAG and launches their missiles. In all 
scenarios, the SAG is on course 225o true with the USV positions varying depending on 
OPSIT. Seas are calm at a sea state of two. Ambient air temperature is 22o Celsius with 
50% humidity, producing a small evaporative duct height of two meters. This slightly 
increases the maximum detection range of air search radars when compared to an 
environment without evaporative ducting. 
a. OPSIT 1 – USVs Fire on Inbound ASCMs 
In OPSIT 1, the USVs are steaming in formation with the SAG, positioned between 
the SAG and the inbound missiles. The USVs either detect the threat or are cued where to 
search from the ships. The USVs deploy response options. 
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(1) Sub OPSIT 1A – USV Off the Threat Axis 
In this sub OPSIT, the USVs are not directly between the threat and the SAG and 
are positioned to detect threats near their maximum detection range. 
(2) Sub OPSIT 1B – USV On the Threat Axis 
In this sub OPSIT, the USVs lie directly between the threat and the SAG such that 
the threat missiles pass directly overhead of the USV. 
b. OPSIT 2 – Untargeted USV Detects Inbound ASCM and Cues SAG 
In OPSIT 2, the SAG ships are targeted, and the USVs remain undetected or 
untargeted. The USVs are positioned between the SAG and the inbound missiles and are 
able to pass track data to the SAG ships to increase the available response time from initial 
threat detection for the SAG ships to deploy their own response options. 
(1) Sub OPSIT 2A – USV Off the Threat Axis 
In this scenario, the USVs are not directly between the threat and the SAG and are 
positioned to detect threats tangential to their maximum detection range. The USVs receive 
the initial indications of threat missiles via their onboard air search radar or ES systems, 
gain track of the ASCM(s) quickly, and pass the track data to the SAG, cueing the SAG’s 
self-defense responses. 
(2) Sub OPSIT 2B – USV On the Threat Axis 
In this scenario, the USVs lie directly between the threat and the SAG. The USVs 
receive the initial indications of threat missiles via their onboard air search radar or ES 
systems, gain track of the ASCM(s) quickly, and pass the track data to the SAG, cueing 
the SAG’s self-defense responses. 
3. Mission Execution 
a. OPSIT 1 – USVs Fire on Inbound ASCMs 
1. USV or other ships in company make initial detection of inbound 
ASCM through active air search radar or passive ES means (if 
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passive detection occurs first, active radar search focuses on 
bearing obtained from electronic sources). 
2. If initial detection is not made by USV, USV air search radars are 
cued to conduct focused search or the track data is passed to USVs. 
3. USV’s combat systems suite determines precise location and 
assigns track numbers to ASCMs. 
4. Tracks are shared and deconflicted by use of Tactical Data Links 
(TDLs) and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). 
5. ASCM tracks are designated a high priority and updated at the 
combat systems’ fastest rate. 
6. USV’s combat system calculates expected track of ASCMs and 
missile interceptors along with the amount of time the USV has 
available to conduct a successful intercept. 
7. USVs launch missile interceptors and deploy electronic 
countermeasures. 
8. USV radar systems and operators on manned ships in company 
conduct detailed search of intercept location to make assessment. 
9. If inbound ASCMs survived engagement, USVs reengage if there 
is enough time to consummate the engagement or point defense 
systems are cued to engage. 
b. OPSIT 2 – Untargeted USV Detects Inbound ASCM and Cues SAG 
1. USVs make initial detection of inbound ASCM through active air 
search radar or passive ES means (if passive detection occurs first, 
active radar search focuses on bearing obtained from electronic 
sources). 
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2. USVs transmit track data to other ships in company. 
3. Ship’s combat systems suite determines precise location and 
assigns track numbers to ASCMs. 
4. Tracks are shared and deconflicted by use of TDLs and CEC. 
5. ASCM tracks are designated a high priority and updated at the 
combat systems’ fastest rate. 
6. Ships’ combat systems calculate expected track of ASCMs and 
missile interceptors along with the amount of time the ship has 
available to conduct a successful intercept. 
7. Ships launch missile interceptors and deploy electronic 
countermeasures. 
8. Ships’ radar systems and operators conduct detailed search of 
intercept location to make assessment. 
9. If inbound ASCMs survived engagement, ships reengage if there is 
enough time to consummate the engagement or point defense 
systems are cued to engage. 
4. Measures 
The goal of employing the USV in this manner is to is to significantly reduce or 
eliminate the number of threats that reach the self-defense area of SAG units. The primary 
measures of interest for determining the USV’s potential to defeat ASCMs via kinetic or 
non-kinetic means were therefore the number of hard kills and soft kills against ASCMs 
across multiple iterations of a Markov kill chain model. 
In the analysis of the USV as a cueing platform, the primary measure of interest 
was the early warning detection time in seconds. This time the time from the earliest USV 
detection in the scenario compared against the assessed organic SAG detection time if the 
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USV was not present. This time was also used to derive the potential number of additional 
shot opportunities, another measure of interest. 
In the analysis of USV-SAG geometries, the measures of interest were degrees of 
coverage and linear distance. The degrees of coverage pertain to the ASCM detection 
screen provided by the geometric USV spacing in a given formation. The screen was 
measured in degrees radially from the SAG in the center of the USV formation. The linear 
distance pertains to the summation of the distances of each USV to the SAG. This distance 
relates to the potential overall early warning detection time and, correspondingly, the 
number of additional shot opportunities against incoming ASCM threats. 
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III. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
A. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS INTRODUCTION 
In conceptual system design activities, such as in our use case of the medium-sized 
USV, system needs and requirements must first be developed and understood (Blanchard 
and Fabrycky 2011). From the DRM, the determined operational needs are: 
1. USV use shall mitigate the probability of ASCM hit on SAG ships by 
defeating threats via kinetic or non-kinetic means. 
2. USV use shall provide early warning and threat cueing to SAG ships, 
thereby increasing available reaction time and counter-fire opportunities of 
SAG ships from initial threat detection compared to a no-USV scenario. 
3. ASCM detection and response subsystems on the USV host platform must 
not require the USV to be larger than medium sized. 
These will form the basis of the subsystem requirements necessary to implement 
ASCM defense capabilities on the medium-sized USV. The detection subsystems of 
interest in this study are the air search radar and ES subsystems. The response subsystems 
of interest in this study are the soft-kill deception countermeasure, SAM, CIWS, and radio 
frequency jamming (also known as EA) subsystems. 
For each of these subsystems, requirements were generated to address the 
operational needs while being grounded by current technology or technology that could 
realistically be fielded within the next two years. Concepts of employment for each 
subsystem provide context to inform specific subsystem level requirements. Requirements 
for additional support subsystems—such as power or cooling, for example—were derived 
through discussion of these concepts of employment and further refined after system 
selection. A full list of generated requirements is available in Appendix A. 
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B. DETECTION SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The detection subsystems are the air search radar and the ES system. These two 
systems interact with the USV via an integrated combat system (ICS) onboard the USV 
that also drives USV responses for an ASCM attack. By providing the necessary processed 
data to the SAG including target tracks, these subsystems cue the SAG ships to threats. 
Additionally, they provide the ability to meld their returns into a common display with the 
SAG ships, thereby increasing situational awareness. 
Given the threat missiles have known velocities and may have correlative 
electromagnetic signatures, the detection subsystems can implement contact 
discrimination. Engagement settings and threat profiles can be established by remote SAG 
operators to automatically filter out items not of interest. Filtering raw data into contacts 
of interest (COIs) alleviates bandwidth consumption compared to transmission of all raw 
contact data. This discrimination logic can be edited to reflect a specific operating area or 
threat level. For the purpose of this paper, a COI is defined as an air contact with a velocity 
of greater than 400 knots travelling towards the SAG. Friendly aircraft returning to the 
SAG would be discounted based on positive identification (such as via Identification 
Friend or Foe, secure communications, and check-in procedures). 
1. Air Search Radar 
The air search radar must detect contacts at a range that allows for sufficient time 
to identify threats and deploy appropriate response measures to defeat the threat. To obtain 
tactically relevant detection ranges against air threats, the air search radar must be elevated 
to achieve detection over the horizon. 
To prevent time lag and communication relay issues, the radar system shall process 
radar data onboard. The communication subsystem will provide this processed data in the 
form of target tracks to the SAG ships for threat cueing. The air search radar shall also be 
able to receive changes to its operating parameters (e.g., cued search areas, power levels, 
no transmission areas, and COI parameters) should an operator on one of the SAG ships 
need to adapt them to a changing operational environment or to prevent interference with 
other equipment, such as navigation radars. 
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Due to the high speed of ASCMs and large area to be searched, the radar system 
must have both volume search and cued search capability, as well as functionality for high-
resolution tracking. This can be accomplished within one multi-function radar or the 
system may consist of multiple radars to fulfill the different roles. In either case, the 
radar(s) used need to be able to distinguish incoming threat missiles from other airborne 
objects. 
2. Electronic Support System 
The ES system must be capable of detecting threat missiles in their expected emitter 
operating frequency bands when they are emitting. These emitters must be detected at a 
range that allows for sufficient time to identify threats and deploy appropriate response 
measures to defeat the threat. The ES system must therefore also be elevated enough to 
achieve adequate detection ranges. The ES system must also provide elevation angle 
coverage to detect incoming threats from the surface as well as high elevation attacks. 
To prevent time lag and communication relay issues, the system shall process ES 
data onboard the USV. This processed data will include line of bearing information and 
signal strength, and it will be provided locally to the ICS and to the SAG via the 
communication subsystem. Additionally, the ES system will be capable of isolating own 
ship emitters to prevent spurious detections. The ES system shall also be able to receive 
changes to its operating parameters (e.g., cued search bearings, search areas, and COI 
parameters) should an operator on one of the SAG ships need to adapt them to a changing 
operational environment.  
C. RESPONSE SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
After obtaining track on an inbound ASCM, several subsystems may be activated 
to defeat the threat by either kinetic or non-kinetic means. The former seeks to destroy the 
ASCM in flight while the latter seeks to disrupt or deceive the flight path of the missile by 
using chaff, flares, and decoys or by attacking the missile’s terminal homing seeker on the 
electromagnetic spectrum. Subsystems considered for these applications must account for 
the smaller size of a medium USV relative to a standard cruiser or destroyer. 
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Regardless of method, all response subsystems are cued by the ICS after it has 
received the necessary data from the detection subsystems. The timing in which responses 
are activated is determined by the calculated intercept and the necessary time for personnel 
and systems to react. Thus, in some instances all response subsystems may be employed 
while in others only one will be used. To deconflict responses while defending the SAG, 
the ICS will communicate with the rest of the SAG through TDLs and CEC. The USV can 
take action either autonomously through pre-established weapons engagement settings, or 
it will receive engagement commands from the SAG. 
1. Soft-Kill Deception Countermeasures 
One method proposed to lessen the probability of an inbound ASCM hitting a SAG 
ship is the use of soft-kill deception countermeasures. These attempt to lure inbound 
ASCMs away from SAG ships by deceiving them into pursuing a decoy target. This will 
protect the SAG and also reduce risk of damage to the USV. 
To counter the variety of ASCM threats, the USV will have the ability to launch 
chaff to protect against radar guided missiles or flares to protect against infrared guided 
missiles. The launcher in the chosen countermeasure system should be able to launch both 
types of payloads to eliminate the need for unique launchers, thereby keeping SWaP 
requirements to a minimum. The countermeasure system will need to be able to intercept 
missiles coming from any direction. This can be accomplished either by installing multiple 
sets of launchers with fixed firing positions to obtain 360-degree coverage or by installing 
dynamic launchers that can be aimed as needed. A dynamic system should be able to use 
data received from the detection subsystems to automatically aim the barrels. Launchers 
chosen for this design will fire commonly available rounds (not require custom-made chaff 
or flare rounds). 
These countermeasure systems cannot act alone, so communication links with other 
systems will be required. The ICS will analyze detection data from the radar and ES 
systems to direct the countermeasure subsystem to release chaff or flares as appropriate 
against the incoming ASCM. Detection subsystems will also provide information detailing 
the track and speed of the ASCM. Given the threat missile velocities and relative proximity 
27 
to the USV that the countermeasures are deployed, it is assumed the countermeasure 
system will have only one chance to neutralize the ASCM. Once a response round has 
launched, an event message signifying launch will be provided by the countermeasure 
system to the ICS and the SAG ships. The detection systems will continue to track the 
ASCM target. After receipt of the countermeasure launch message, indications from the 
detection system that the threat exists or no longer exists will serve as the battle damage 
assessment. This subsystem will periodically return a status message to the ICS for further 
dissemination to the SAG so operators know the health of the countermeasure launchers 
and the amount of payload available for use. 
2. Surface to Air Missiles 
The USV will be equipped with a SAM subsystem as a long-range response 
measure to engage and intercept ASCM threats. For this study, long-range is defined as 
more than 3.7 kilometers (two nautical miles), the threshold range for the CIWS 
subsystems. The SAM subsystem will consist of the SAM, the launcher, and corresponding 
SAM control systems integrated with the ICS. The SAM subsystem will be able to be 
configured to either engage threats autonomously or to require receipt of a launch order 
from the SAG in order to engage threats. In both scenarios, some level of automation is 
required for weapons launch. The ethics of a remote weapons launch and semi or full 
automation in weapons launch is not addressed in this paper. This study will simply attempt 
to address if such an employment concept is feasible and meets technical requirements. 
Auto-engaging incoming threats requires a confirmed threat classification from the 
ICS. The ICS will receive initial configuration of threat profiles and rules of engagement 
settings and any configuration updates from operators in the SAG via the communication 
subsystem. 
If operational commanders determine authority to launch SAMs must be obtained 
from operators in the SAG, the USV will first send a data package to the SAG detailing 
target information including track and threat classification as well as calculated launch 
parameters. Upon receipt, review, and approval by SAG operators, the USV would be 
enabled to launch. Provided the USV is granted authorization to fire, it will either launch 
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SAMs, or it will be unable to launch because the target no longer meets launch criteria for 
any reason, including that a firing solution may no longer exist due to proximity or 
geometry between the ASCM and the USV or defended assets. 
Following launch, the SAMs will be able to receive updated guidance information 
from the USV and the SAG. The SAM subsystem will report general health and status 
messages and launch event reports. The SAM subsystem will use a missile capable of in-
flight maneuvering and equipped with infrared seekers at a minimum to address the ASCM 
threat. 
3. Close-in Weapons System 
If the ASCM passes through long-range defenses, a short-range CIWS on the USV 
will be able engage the ASCMs and protect the SAG, provided the geometry between the 
USV and the ASCM supports the engagement. For this study, the terms “short-range” and 
“close-in” are interchangeable and defined as 3.7 kilometers (two nautical miles) or less. 
Since a CIWS is inherently a short-range system, it has short timelines in which it can 
prosecute targets and must leverage automation to do so. 
The CIWS will need to have a maximum range of at least 3.7 kilometers (two 
nautical miles) to cover the area defined as close-in. It must be able to automatically detect 
and track incoming threats. The CIWS will automatically fire when a threat is identified in 
range and will cease fire when it no longer detects the threat, has detected elimination of 
the threat, or detects the threat is outbound or outside its engagement range, or to prevent 
accidental engagement of friendly forces. The CIWS must use commonly available rounds 
and must not require custom ammunition. 
Even though the CIWS will be fully autonomous, it will require communication 
with the ICS so operators in the SAG can configure the CIWS including rules of 
engagement settings and threat profiles. Additionally, it must be able to receive handoff 
information from the ICS via the long-range defenses as well. This subsystem will also 
periodically send status messages to the ICS for further dissemination to the SAG operators 
will know the health of the subsystem, the amount of ammunition remaining for use, and 
the battle damage assessment from any engagements. 
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4. Radio Frequency Jamming or Electronic Attack 
Besides attempting to cause the ASCM to detonate away from its intended target, 
another soft-kill approach is to employ active radio frequency jamming. Otherwise known 
as EA, this is focused on jamming the active homing seeker on the ASCM, thereby making 
it unable to lock onto its intended target. Such an EA capability could be combined with 
ES and soft-kill deception countermeasures into a single EW system, some capabilities 
could be combined in an EW system, or the capabilities may be split up into their own 
individual systems. 
The range of the EA would need to be able to affect the ASCM far enough away to 
ensure the ASCM fails to lock on before entering its terminal phase. Furthermore, the EA 
system must operate on the frequency bands employed by the seekers on expected threat 
missiles. The EA system must also be able to receive threat parameter updates from the 
SAG via the ICS. 
The ICS will validate the ASCM target based on information provided by the 
detection subsystems and threat criteria provided by SAG operators. Upon determination 
the threat is susceptible to jamming, the ICS will pass the ASCM track and emitter data to 
the EA subsystem and direct execution of EA. The ASCM threat will continue to be tracked 
by detection subsystems and may require additional response measures including hard-kill 
responses if the ICS determines the missile threat is not sufficiently addressed by jamming 
alone. 
D. DERIVED SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Additional subsystems will be necessary to support the detection and response 
subsystems. All subsystems will be required to interact with the ICS, and they will also 
require services from the USV such as electrical power, cooling, hydraulics, positioning, 
navigation, and timing services. It was therefore necessary to articulate additional 
requirements these support subsystems must perform in order to meet the detection and 
response subsystem requirements. 
30 
1. Integrated Combat System 
The ICS primary functions are to manage all USV combat system interactions and 
to execute USV command and control functions with initial input and configuration 
updates from SAG operators. 
The ICS will act as contact manager and track integrator. Once an ES or radar COI 
has been detected, the data will be compared with engagement parameters, which will be 
comprised of both ES and radar threat level tripwires. These parameters and thresholds 
must be editable via the SAG remotely. The ICS shall make determinations whether COIs 
meet engagement parameters and command the appropriate response subsystem reaction. 
It will provide relevant information including ASCM track, emitter information, and 
response measure type to the launchers to maximize the effectiveness of the response 
measures. It will also interface with all onboard subsystems in order to provide the 
detection and response subsystems with accurate data, such as position, navigation, and 
timing data or status of other systems, for instance. Response subsystems will provide the 
ICS general health and status messages and launch event reports. 
The ICS will serve as the primary conduit for all detection and response subsystems 
to interface with the USV communications systems back to the SAG. Onboard the USV, it 
will integrate with each subsystem via a common architecture like the Common Object 
Request Broker Architecture. This architecture is not envisioned to be unique to our 
subsystems of interest and is expected to also interface with any other subsystem not 
covered under the scope of this study. 
2. Electrical Power 
The electrical power system must be able to generate and provide enough power at 
the correct voltage, frequency, and phase to support all onboard systems. This requires the 
system to generate power at 450 volts alternating current at 60 hertz in 3-phase. The power 
must then be able to be directly distributed in 3-phase or in a single-phase as well as 
transformed down to 120 volts. The 120 volts alternating current at 60 hertz will then be 
distributed in 3-phase or in a single-phase. Frequency converters must also be able to create 
120 volts alternating current power at 400 hertz in 3-phase for further distribution. 
31 
Since the USV will not have personnel onboard to respond to emergencies at a 
moment’s notice, the system must be capable of self-monitoring for potential and 
confirmed system faults. Further, the system must be able to report its status to the ICS for 
further transmission to the SAG as well as respond autonomously to any electrical 
problems by taking such actions as isolating circuits or equipment, shutting down 
switchboards or generators, and shifting the electrical distribution configuration. 
3. Cooling 
For sustainable operations, subsystem cooling will be required. Seawater cooling 
will be required for heat tolerant systems and chill water for heat sensitive systems.  
Recalling that the envisioned operating environment for the USV is in waters from 2—35 
degrees Celsius, it is noted that a seawater-based cooling system’s effectiveness will 
depend on environmental conditions. Cold seawater is more advantageous, while more 
tropical waters can make regular cooling more challenging. 
A traditional on-board chill-water system is assumed to be a requirement for heat 
sensitive subsystems such as electronics. Since the USV is unmanned, it is assumed it will 
be heavily populated with electronics racks to address processing requirements of its 
various subsystems and that it will already have a robust chill-water subsystem in place.  
Subsystems and components like the ICS and detection and response subsystem processors 
will still require additional dedicated and stable cooling. 
Given the SWaP requirements for cooling units and the limited space and power 
available onboard the USV, high heat generating items that can withstand changes in 
temperature are ill-suited to be incorporated in the chill-water cooling system because the 
chill-water system would have difficulty maintaining its cooling capability. As such, it will 
be necessary to incorporate and maintain a separate seawater-based cooling system. 
4. Hydraulics 
USV machinery parameters must be controlled precisely. Moving hydraulic oil to 
open and close hydraulic valves remotely from an automated control system can maintain 
requisite fluid pressures and move heavy parts. Applications are important for propulsion, 
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electrical power generation, and steering systems, as well as for combat systems equipment 
with moving parts, such as directing the launch vector for response subsystems. The 
hydraulics system will need to integrate with the ICS to receive input for instantaneous 
response subsystem demands and respond accordingly. 
5. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
The positioning, navigation, and timing system onboard the USV must comply with 
accuracy standards set forth in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6130.01, the 
Department of Defense Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan. This will allow 
for accurate and precise determination of both the USV three-dimensional location—
referenced to World Geodetic System 1984—and the Coordinated Universal Time. These 
measurements are critical to USV effectiveness as a maritime platform and the 
effectiveness of its onboard weapons systems. The system must interact with the ICS to 
pass positioning, navigation, and timing data to all combat systems. 
Use of an inertial navigation system allows for determination of position absent 
GPS input in case of GPS denial. This supports the navigation goal of the system to provide 
for effective and safe navigation in accordance with COLREGs, UNCLOS, and other 
international agreements, unless overridden by the ICS. Such an override would be 
necessary when operational commanders determine the tactical situation warrants 
navigation methods not in accordance with such agreements. Normally, operators would 
pass navigation and stationing instructions to the USV via the ICS but would not override 
the normal safety and international agreement conformance programming. Either way, the 
system will determine and apply course and speed corrections to attain position and 
maintain station. 
33 
IV. SUBSYSTEM SELECTION 
A. SUBSYSTEM SELECTION INTRODUCTION 
Following requirements generation, the physical components and corresponding 
host platform SWaP requirements were identified. Potential subsystems for inclusion in 
this analysis were identified and compared against the subsystem requirements and the 
concepts of system employment. To maintain an unclassified study, all subsystems and 
components considered for the design were current COTS or GOTS products, and all data 
was collected from publicly available sources. The subsystems and components were not 
restricted to any particular nation or group of nations. 
Consideration was also given to combinations of subsystems to assess if emergent 
behaviors are more favorable when systems operate coherently rather than individually. At 
the conclusion of this analysis, a system was selected for each detection and response 
subsystem of interest for inclusion in a notional medium-sized USV. For the ICS and 
support systems, such as electrical power, cooling, hydraulics, positioning, navigation, and 
timing services, and other services required for the proper function of the detection and 
response systems, it is assumed there is an existing equivalent on the host platform. This 
analysis will therefore not make specific COTS or GOTS recommendations for those 
systems. 
B. DETECTION SUBSYSTEM COMPARISON AND SELECTION 
1. Air Search Radar 
Many radars were ruled out due to their large SWaP requirements. For example, 
the smallest AN/SPY-1 radar variant is the SPY-1F. This radar was designed for frigates 
(larger than a medium-sized USV), consists of four 2.44-meter wide octagonal panels 
mounted on the sides of the superstructure, and the entire system including below deck 
portions weighs over 20 metric tons (Janes by IHS Markit 2018b; Lockheed Martin 2009). 
The AN/SPS-49 fulfills the requirements for an air search radar on the USV. It has 
a rotation clearance of 8.7 meters and is currently installed on U.S. aircraft carriers, 
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cruisers, and amphibious ships as well as Australian, New Zealand, Spanish, Korean, and 
Canadian ships (Pike 1999). Due to the 8.7 meter clearance requirement, it was determined 
this radar could be used if it was installed high or otherwise lifted, which is something that 
will need to occur in order to achieve the required radar range anyways. Figure 8 shows 
the SPS-49 as outfitted aboard a Korean destroyer. 
 
Figure 8.  AN/SPS-49 Radar. Source: Richards (n.d.). 
A more recent option not utilized by the USN is the SAMPSON, produced by BAE 
Systems and used by France and the United Kingdom. It consists of two array faces rotating 
inside a radome, has a range of 400 kilometers and weighs 4.6 metric tons (Jane’s by IHS 
Markit 2019b). It is also assumed to fulfill the various tracking and contact generation 
requirements, since it is widely in use by the United Kingdom in conjunction with their 
Sea Viper Naval Air Defense System and would probably not be if it was unable to 
complete those requirements (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance 2018). However, since 
it is not used in the USN, an unknown amount of effort would need to be expended 
integrating it into the ICS and the USN communication architecture since it likely will not 
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be compatible off-the-shelf. The SAMPSON is shown in Figure 9 sitting atop the mainmast 
of HMS Daring. 
 
Figure 9.  SAMPSON Radar (Radome Atop Mast). Source: Hpeterswald 
(2013). 
To support the next generation of USN surface combatants and replace the AN/
SPY-1 radar, Raytheon developed the AN/SPY-6 and a smaller version, the Enterprise Air 
Surveillance Radar (EASR), which can be placed on a single face rotating array or in a 
three faced fixed array configuration (Raytheon Company 2019). The fixed array 
configuration is preferred over the rotating array due to less moving parts leading to a lower 
maintenance requirement and because a fixed array configuration would work well with 
USN integrated topside design initiatives. The two EASR variants are shown in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10.  EASR Variant 1 (Left) and a Single Face of Variant 2 
(Right). Adapted from Raytheon Company (2019). 
A short-range radar will be necessary to track ASCMs close to the USV to mitigate 
the short-range coverage gap, or shadow zone, common to long-range radars. ASCMs will 
be engaged in this short-range space by CIWS. Therefore, space can be saved by ensuring 
the selected CIWS includes an integrated short-range air search radar. After selection of 
the CIWS, additional software or hardware development may be necessary to ensure the 
CIWS radar interfaces with the ICS to meet track generation, update, and sharing 
requirements. 
Ultimately, the SPS-49 and SAMPSON radars are adequate but require a large 
footprint on the medium-sized USV, so the EASR was selected as the primary air search 
radar for the USV as well as ensuring the CIWS includes an integrated short-range air 
search radar. Variant 2, the three-faced fixed array variant, was selected over Variant 1. 
Weight and power requirements were approximated as a scalable function of the SPY-1A. 
This leads to an approximate weight of 6.7 metric tons including below-deck support 
systems and a power requirement of 440 volts alternating current at 60 hertz in 3-phase 
(Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018b). The USV superstructure will be designed of appreciable 
height to support the panels of the EASR and attain required radar range. 
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2. Electronic Support System 
Two ES systems were examined as potential candidates. The USN Surface 
Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) consists of many iterative upgrades to 
the AN/SLQ-32 equipped on almost all USN surface combatants. The Outfit UAT is 
produced by Thales and is found on the United Kingdom’s major surface combatants. 
Legacy AN/SLQ-32 systems can detect emitters transmitting from a frequency 
range of 250 MHz–20 GHz, and some versions, such as those found on USN cruisers and 
destroyers, have an offensive jamming capability (Forecast International 1999). All 
versions are integrated with the Mk 36 Super Rapid Bloom Offboard Countermeasures 
(SRBOC), except for those equipped on aircraft carriers (Forecast International 1999). It is 
known the system requires cooling, especially for its electronics, but specific details are 
unavailable. Additionally, specific frequency ranges for emitters that can be detected by 
SEWIP upgraded units are classified, but they will encompass a wider range than the legacy 
SLQ-32 (Lockheed Martin 2016). Likewise, integration capability with SRBOC is 
assumed to remain in SEWIP upgraded systems. SEWIP Block 2 relies heavily on COTS 
components, and the Block 3 upgrade will add EA capability to the system (Cole 2015). 
An artist’s rendering of proposed SEWIP Block 3 antennas is shown in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11.  SEWIP Block 3 Antennas (Circled in Red). Adapted from 
Northrop Grumman (2019). 
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The Outfit UAT is able to detect signals from 2–18 GHz and can be reconfigured 
to cover other frequencies as well (Thales 7 Seas n.d.). Similar to the SLQ-32, 
identification of received emissions occurs by comparing to a library of known emitters. 
Furthermore, it is integrated with its associated chaff systems to allow automatic responses 
(Thales 7 Seas n.d.). The pyramid shaped Outfit UAT antennas are shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.  Outfit UAT (Circled in Red). Adapted from Thales 7 Seas (n.d.). 
The SEWIP upgraded AN/SLQ-32 system was chosen as the ES system due to its 
interoperability with other USN combat systems and its wider frequency range compared 
to the Outfit UAT. Additionally, the planned integration of EA in the SEWIP Block 3 
upgrade will allow for a single EW system, allowing for SWaP savings compared to two 
separate ES and EA systems. Finally, the Block 3 upgrade will also align with USN 
integrated topside design initiatives. 
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C. RESPONSE SUBSYSTEM COMPARISON AND SELECTION 
1. Soft-Kill Deception Countermeasures 
Available unclassified countermeasure information was weighed against system 
requirements to compare potential subsystems. The Mk 36 SRBOC and Centurion chaff 
and flare launchers were chosen for this down select process. The SRBOC is made by BAE 
Systems for the USN and other countries, and the Centurion is made by Chemring 
Countermeasures for the UK. 
According to the manufacturers’ websites, both subsystems can launch chaff and 
infrared countermeasures, meeting the requirement to be multifunctional, and both systems 
can fire standard Mk 36 rounds, meeting the requirement to use standard non-custom 
rounds (BAE Systems 2019; Chemring Countermeasures 2013a, 2013b).  Both subsystems 
are equipped with control subsystems to receive firing inputs (Chemring Countermeasures 
2013b; Ward n.d.). 
Where these subsystems differ is in the dynamic versus static nature of the barrels.  
According to Larry Ward’s data sheet from United Defense (n.d.), a single launcher in the 
SRBOC system contains six static barrels, and the system supports installing multiple 
launchers in different areas to cover the required 360-degree area around the defended unit.  
These barrels are aimed at fixed locations, some at 45 degrees and some at 60 degrees 
(Ward n.d.). The SRBOC system is shown in action in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13.  SRBOC System. Source: BAE Systems (2019). 
The Centurion launcher is specifically designed for use on smaller vessels; the 
barrels fold up when not in use, allowing the system to be constructed on a lighter frame 
and be more compact, and they will unfold when launching (Chemring Countermeasures 
2013b). The system also includes a stabilizer that helps compensate for sea motion 
affecting the vessel, and it will rotate to point the barrels in the needed firing direction 
(Chemring Countermeasures 2013b). The launcher may also be installed with a cover that 
will minimize its radar cross-section (Chemring Countermeasures 2013b). 
The Centurion launcher was determined to be a better fit for a medium-sized USV 
due to its versatility and lightweight, compact design for smaller vessels. The Centurion 
launcher is shown with the cover installed in Figure 14 and without the cover in Figure 15. 
Figure 16 is a screen capture of a Chemring Countermeasures promotional video depicting 
relative system size compared against two operators loading the launcher. 
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Figure 14.  Centurion Launcher with Cover Installed. Source: Chemring 
Countermeasures (2014). 
 




Figure 16.  Operators Loading a Centurion Launcher. Adapted from Wow 
Media Limited (2013). 
2. Surface to Air Missiles 
When considering SAMs, both the missile system and launcher system need to be 
selected. For the launchers, the required deck space and depth of the launchers are crucial 
size factors. Two primary candidates for missile defense were considered. The first was the 
Standard Missile (SM) family of missiles, with the addition of the Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Missile (ESSM), launched by the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), commonly in use 
by the USN. The other was the Aster family of missiles, launched by the SYstème de 
Lancement VERtical (SYLVER), which is used onboard naval ships of the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, and other countries. 
The Standard Missiles considered were the SM-2 Medium Range and SM-6, with 
the addition of the ESSM since it is also VLS capable. Depending on the block of the 
missile, the SM-2 Medium Range has a range of 130, 165, or 170 kilometers (70.19, 89.09, 
or 91.79 nautical miles) and relies on semi-active terminal guidance (Jane’s by IHS Markit 
2013). The SM-2 weighs 0.708 metric tons, is 4.72 meters long, and has a 0.34 meter 
diameter (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2013). The SM-6 has a much longer range of 370 
kilometers (199.78 nautical miles) and uses both semi-active and active terminal guidance, 
but it is much larger, weighing 1.497 metric tons with a length of 6.55 meters and a 0.34 
meter diameter (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2013). Despite the size, it is still VLS capable. The 
ESSM is much smaller, weighing only 0.297 metric tons with a length of 3.64 meters and 
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a 0.25 meter diameter, and due to its small size, four ESSMs can be placed into a single 
Mk 41 VLS cell (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2019a; Missile Threat 2018; Rogoway 2017). As a 
result, however, it has a nominal range of only 50 kilometers (27 nautical miles) (Missile 
Threat 2018). 
All of these missiles require mid-course guidance through uplink and downlink 
messages, and they use semi-active terminal guidance, meaning a separate system is 
required to emit a beam of electromagnetic energy at the ASCM that is then reflected to 
the interceptor missile (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2013, 2019a; Missile Threat 2018; Rogoway 
2017). USN ships use the AN/SPG-62 radar, part of the Mk 99 Fire Control System, to 
perform this illumination and terminal guidance function, which requires electrical energy, 
auxiliary services, and deck space for the antennae (Pike 2011a). In addition to semi-active 
terminal guidance capability, the SM-6 and the ESSM Block 2 variant use terminal active 
radar homing, thereby mitigating the requirement for illumination from and reliance on an 
external system (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2013; Rogoway 2017). The SM-2 is shown in Figure 
17. The SM-6 and ESSM have similar appearance, with different sizes. 
 
Figure 17.  SM-2 Launch. Source: Royal Australian Navy (2011). 
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The Mk 41 VLS missile launching system produced by Lockheed Martin is used by 
the USN and many other navies. Its modular design allows for customization of the 
launching system footprint. The Mk 41 VLS is composed of the launcher and the launch 
control system, and the launch control system is made up of the launch control unit, remote 
launch enable panel, and the status panel (Kelly n.d.). The system comes in three sizes to 
accommodate various missiles, with the base design for each being an 8-cell module 
requiring 3.4 meters by 2.54 meters of deck space (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018g). The 
smallest size is the self-defense module with a height of 5.31 meters and weighing 12.16 
metric tons empty, the next largest version is the tactical version with a height of 6.76 
meters and weighing 13.5 metric tons empty, and the largest version is the strike version 
with a height of 7.7 meters and weighing 14.5 metric tons empty (Jane’s by IHS Markit 
2018g). The launch control system weighs 0.67 metric tons (Kelly n.d.). Multiple 8-cell 
modules can be built together, such as the case with USN destroyers, where the total system 
weighs 118.84 metric tons empty (Kelly n.d.). An 8-cell VLS is shown in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18.  Mk 41 VLS. Source: Ostheim (n.d.). 
The Aster family of missiles are produced by the European consortium Eurosam 
and were designed to counter supersonic sea-skimming ASCMs. The Aster 15 and Aster 
30 are the two principle variants. Like the SM family, these missiles use a data uplink for 
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mid-course guidance, but unlike the SMs, they use active seekers for terminal guidance 
(Eurosam 2019a). The primary difference between the two Aster missiles is their 
operational range. The Aster 15 range extends from 1.7 to over 30 kilometers (0.92 to over 
16.2 nautical miles), it weighs 0.31 metric tons, it is 4.2 meters long, and it has a 180 
millimeter diameter (Eurosam 2019a; MBDA Missile Systems 2016a). The Aster 30 range 
extends from 3.0 to over 100 kilometers (1.62 to over 54 nautical miles), it weighs 0.51 
metric tons, and is 5.2 meters long, and it also has a 180 millimeter diameter (Eurosam 
2019a). Figure 19 shows the Aster 30 missile. The Aster 15 has a similar appearance. 
 
Figure 19.  Aster 30 Missile. Source: MBDA Missile Systems (2016b). 
Like the Mk 41, the SYLVER launching system is constructed in eight cell modules 
and comes in a variety of sizes to accommodate different sized missiles (Eurosam 2019b). 
The A-43 variant can only support the Aster 15 with a height of 5.4 meters, a weight of 7.5 
metric tons, and footprint on deck of 2.6 meters by 2.3 meters, while the A-50 variant can 
support both the Aster 15 or 30 with a height of 6.1 meters, weight of eight metric tons, 
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and footprint on deck of 2.6 meters by 2.3 meters (Eurosam 2019b). The SYLVER 
launching system is shown in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20.  SYLVER Launching System. Source: Seaforces Naval Information 
(n.d.). 
In consideration of the best fit missile, nominal USV detection range must first be 
assessed. Missiles with ranges that exceed the organic detection radius of the USV provide 
no practical advantage in this study. Equation 1 is Robinson’s (2019) simplified radar 
horizon equation against a target at elevation in metric units, adapted for use where the 
surface unit is the detection platform against an inbound ASCM. Therefore, RH is the radar 
horizon range in kilometers, hAntenna is the height of the USV (or ship) radar antenna in 
meters, and hASCM is the height of the ASCM in meters. 
 4.124 ( )H Antenna ASCMR h h= × +  (1) 
Assuming the USV radar height is 12 meters and given the nominal cruise missile 
altitude for each of the three missile threats from Jane’s by IHS Markit (2018a, 2018c, 
2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018h) of approximately 20 meters, the equation results in the USV’s 
maximum detection range of 32.72 kilometers (17.67 nautical miles). 
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The ESSM Block 2 was therefore selected as the USV SAM due to its range being 
sufficient to cover the USV maximum detection range and because it presents the smallest 
footprint of the evaluated missiles. Also, the ESSM Block 2 has the added benefit of not 
requiring an additional fire control system for terminal guidance, since it is equipped with 
an active seeker. 
Both the Mk 41 VLS and the SYLVER were determined not to be adequate launch 
systems because of their SWaP requirements. Specifically, the height of the USV from the 
keel to the main deck is not tall enough to fully contain the launcher. The amount of deck 
space required by the launchers as well as the overall system weight was also significant. 
A deck-mounted launcher was therefore favored to mitigate below deck impacts 
and allow more space for support systems. With selection of the ESSM as the missile, the 
Mk 29 Guided Missile Launching System, already compatible with the ESSM, was 
investigated. At 6.38 metric tons empty, the MK 29 weighs about three-fourths that of the 
SYLVER launching system and about half that of the MK 41 VLS (Raytheon Company 
2007). The Mk 29 was therefore selected as the SAM launching system due to SWaP 
considerations given the selection of the ESSM as the missile. Use of a fixed, non-rotating 
Mk 29 launcher is likely feasible and could be investigated for the benefit of reduced 
maintenance and increased reliability and evaluated against cost and performance 
tradeoffs. A Mk 29 launching an ESSM is depicted in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21.  ESSM Launch from Mk 29 Launching System. Source: Rogoway 
(2017). 
3. Close-in Weapons System 
Two CIWS components were chosen for this down select process due to their 
autonomous capability and ability to fire commonly available rounds. The first was the 
Phalanx originally created by General Dynamics and equipped on almost all USN surface 
ships and used by many foreign militaries (General Dynamics 2003b). This system was 
purchased by Raytheon who is the current manufacturer (Department of the Navy 2019). 
The second CIWS system was the Goalkeeper made by Thales Defense in conjunction with 
General Dynamics, currently in use by several foreign militaries (General Dynamics 
2003a). Range information on these systems is classified. 
According to General Dynamics (2003b), the Phalanx CIWS uses a Gatling gun 
that fires 20 millimeter rounds at a speed up to 4,500 rounds per minute. The magazine of 
this weapon holds 1,550 rounds, and the system is autonomous, using a Ku-band search 
and track radar at 12 to 18 GHz (General Dynamics 2003b). This CIWS weighs 6.17 metric 
tons and has an internal seawater cooling system (General Dynamics 2003b). The Phalanx 
is shown in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22.  The Phalanx CIWS. Source: Raytheon Company (2018). 
The Goalkeeper uses a seven-barrel Gatling gun that fires 30 millimeter rounds at 
a speed of 4,200 rounds per minute, and the magazine of this weapon holds 1,200 rounds 
(Thales Group n.d.). This system is also autonomous, using I-band radar at 8—10 GHz to 
search for threats and dual frequency I and K-band radar at 8—10 GHz and 20—40 GHz 
to track threats (Thales Group n.d.). Weighing 9.9 metric tons, it is heavier than the Phalanx 
(General Dynamics 2003a). The Goalkeeper is shown in Figure 23.  
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Figure 23.  The Goalkeeper CIWS. Source: Thales Group (n.d.). 
All systems are effective against missiles and are valid choices for the CIWS 
component when functionality is considered. However, the Phalanx was selected over the 
Goalkeeper due to the larger size and weight of the Goalkeeper. 
4. Radio Frequency Jamming or Electronic Attack 
Since all the ES systems analyzed included an EA capability as a single EW system, 
there was no need to select additional EA systems. 
D. DERIVED SIZE, WEIGHT, AND POWER REQUIREMENTS 
Based on the chosen subsystems, SWaP requirements have been identified for the 
medium-sized USV. The air search radar system will be mounted to a superstructure and 
will add a weight of 6.7 metric tons. The EW system requires two separate spaces of 
approximately three by two meters each, within the superstructure to support integrated 
topside design initiatives, and will add a weight of 2.5 metric tons. The countermeasure 
launcher will require a circular space approximately two meters in diameter and will add a 
weight of approximately 1.2 metric tons (Think Defence 2013). The SAM system will 
require a space of approximately 4.7 by 2.0 meters for one launcher holding eight missiles 
and will add a weight of approximately 8.75 metric tons, including the SAMs and the SAM 
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launch control unit. The chosen CIWS will require approximately three by three meters of 
deck space for one unit and will add a weight of 6.17 metric tons. 
These subsystems add a total weight of approximately 25.5 metric tons. This total 
subsystem weight is within the rule of thumb that “a modern warship’s mission payload 
makes up 10–15% of its total displacement” (Kelley 2002, 42). For a vessel with a 300 
long ton displacement, that maximum is 30 to 45 long tons. This leaves available weight 
for required support systems and any additional payloads. This heuristic was developed for 
manned vessels; with no requirement for crew considerations, the percentage of mission 
payload displacement is expected to be even greater. 
Standard ship power is three phase 450 volts at 60 hertz along with the ability to 
convert it to 400 hertz or transform it to 120 volts. Many of the chosen subsystems will 
draw from standard ship power, so consideration will be needed during USV integration to 
ensure it can handle the power draw of the newly added subsystems. The largest power 
requirement for the selected subsystems will be those of the EASR and SEWIP. Power 
consumption data could not be obtained for EASR or SEWIP, but peak power consumption 
is expected to be on the order of tens of megawatts. The Phalanx product specification 
sheets indicate a 70 kilowatt peak power consumption, and the Mk 29 Guided Missile 
Launching System specification sheets present a 55 kilowatt peak value (General 
Dynamics 2003b; Raytheon Company 2007). The Centurion power consumption could not 
be obtained but is expected to also be on the order of kilowatts. Future study areas for ship 
power include identification of total maximum load for all subsystems. 
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V. DERIVED COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 
On the USV, many systems need to seamlessly send and receive information to and 
from other systems to properly execute the mission. This includes external communications 
from the USV to the SAG and internal communications amongst the USV subsystems. 
This chapter discusses requirements and considerations for the communications subsystem. 
Areas outside the scope of this project involving communications are an enemy’s 
ability to misdirect the USV, causing defensive gaps, and specific communication system 
selection. Enemy misdirection of the USV is not within the realm of the DRM, and it would 
be difficult to maintain an unclassified study if specific communication systems’ 
capabilities were discussed in detail. Both areas would be good candidates for future study. 
A. OVERVIEW 
The USV must be able to receive and execute tactical commands from the SAG via 
the ICS. Additionally, the USV needs to indicate receipt of and compliance with these 
directions so operational commanders can account for USV use or plan accordingly if the 
USV is not in receipt of tasking or unable to comply. All directives received from an 
external source must be disseminated to the respective USV subsystems via the ICS, and 
those subsystems must be able to send response messages back to the ICS for compilation 
and dispatch to the SAG.  
The USV subsystems also all use information from each other. Therefore, either all 
subsystems shall be able to communicate with each other in a mutually understandable 
language, or the ICS must be able to communicate with all subsystems in their specific 
language. 
B. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 
In addition to tactical direction, operators on the SAG will send configuration 
updates to the ICS to set operating parameters of the autonomous subsystems. Such 
parameters include threat profiles, rules of engagement, and COI criteria. The SAG and 
USV need to send tactical data to each other to ensure they share a common operating 
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picture. Initial operating picture data will be sent to the ICS on the USV, and tracks sent 
from the USV back to the SAG will then update the common operating picture. LOS 
communications will be primary, with BLOS methods used if the distance between the 
USV and SAG is greater than that supported by LOS communications. Methods available 
for USV to SAG communications include very-high frequency (VHF) radio, ultra-high 
frequency (UHF) radio, satellite communications, and direct datalink systems. 
To detect and appropriately respond to threats, internal communications are 
required between the subsystems located on the USV, facilitated by the ICS. These internal 
communications can be sent over a local area network cable using Ethernet or other 
standard network protocols. Local area network speeds are assumed to be fast enough to 
carry all internal communications in a timely manner. 
Detection subsystems (air search radar and ES portion of the EW system) will 
receive search orders to initiate threat searches. Response subsystems will receive arm and 
disarm orders as well as configuration updates from the ICS. The countermeasure and SAM 
subsystems will need to know the location, type, and speed of the threat to know what 
measure to launch and where. The EW system will need to know where to direct EA. This 
information will be provided by the ICS via launch or EA orders developed using track 
data received from the air search radar and EW subsystems. The ICS will receive status 
reports from the response subsystems and forward them to the SAG for monitoring.  
Figure 24 shows the communications that are required internal to the USV and between 
the USV and the SAG as described above. 
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Figure 24.  Required Internal and External USV Communications 
The following requirements are therefore derived for the USV communications: 
1. External communications shall be accomplished using VHF or UHF 
radios, satellite links, or a direct datalink system. 
2. External communications shall use LOS methods if within range and 
BLOS if beyond the range of LOS methods. 
3. Internal communications shall be accomplished using local area network 
cable connections. 
4. Communication systems shall utilize standard network protocols. 
5. Latency of external communication systems shall be within specifications 
for all equipment and networks used. For example, Satellite Link 16 
requires a latency of no more than 12 seconds (Northrop Grumman 2014). 
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C. DATA SHARING SYSTEMS 
Data must be able to be shared between the USV and the SAG on compatible 
systems. This is to allow for tracks and engagement information—such as orders, reports, 
and battle damage assessments—to be reported from the USV to the SAG and vice versa 
with minimal delay. Common TDLs and CEC will therefore be used. 
The most common TDLs found aboard USN vessels are Link 11, Link 16, and Link 
22. Link 11 is the oldest data link still in use. It creates a network between users for mutual 
exchange of tactical data and operates on both the HF (2—30 MHz) and UHF (225—400 
MHz) portions of the radio spectrum (Northrop Grumman 2014). Two primary 
disadvantages of Link 11 compared to other TDLs are that it is not jam resistant, and it 
relies on a specific unit as a central node (Northrop Grumman 2014). In this construct, if 
the node is lost, the network will go down (Northrop Grumman 2014). 
Link 16 is a secure data link installed on nearly all operational cruisers, destroyers, 
aircraft carriers, airborne early warning aircraft, and fighters. It is transmitted over UHF 
for LOS applications and also has BLOS capability via satellites (Northrop Grumman 
2014). According to the Tactical Data Link Guide by Northrop Grumman (2014), Link 16 
data is formatted in J-Series messages, point-to-point messages or networks of users are 
supported, and it uses the time division multiple access principle to allocate transmission 
and receive timeframes across all units in the network. Link 16 is therefore node-less. It 
also employs frequency hopping to be jam resistant (Northrop Grumman 2014). 
Link 22 is the replacement for Link 11. One of the biggest improvements is that it 
is much more secure and resistant to jamming than Link 11 in part by also employing 
frequency hopping and formatting information it transmits in J-Series messages, allowing 
it to integrate with Link 16 (Northrop Grumman 2014). According to the Tactical Data 
Link Guide by Northrop Grumman (2014), up to eight networks can be integrated into a 
super network consisting of up to 125 units, and it has a built-in automatic relay setting 
that will pass on received data to the rest of the network without any operator actions. It 
has a transmission range of 300 nautical miles (Northrop Grumman 2014). 
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CEC is a method of sharing fire control quality track data between platforms by 
combining radar measurement data from each platform with an organic track on the target 
into one composite track, resulting in each unit having the same air picture (Department of 
the Navy 2017). The Department of the Navy CEC Fact File (2017) also states that 
platforms that do not have an organic radar track on a target can engage the target anyway 
by using the composite track data, which is a significant advantage. 
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VI. EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
To evaluate the operational scenarios described in the DRM, two analysis methods 
were applied: a Markov kill chain and a time series analysis. These analyses use Microsoft 
Excel, Visual Basic for Applications, and Real Options Valuation’s Risk Simulator to 
determine the effectiveness of the USV. The Markov chain model addresses the study goal 
of determining utility of USV responses to ASCM threats. The time series analysis is a 
separate unrelated analysis and determines if the USV provides additional reaction time 
and counter-fire opportunities in the event an incoming ASCM is targeted at the SAG. 
Finally, two basic USV-SAG geometric formations are explored, and their potential 
benefits are compared. 
A. KILL CHAIN MODEL 
1. Kill Chain Model Description 
The first model for this project determines the capability of the USV to defeat 
incoming ASCMs, providing the SAG a defensive advantage as in OPSITs 1A and 1B. The 
model uses a Markov kill chain analysis and was based on Giachetti’s (2015) “System of 
Systems Capability Needs Analysis via a Stochastic Network Model.” A Markov chain 
model is a stochastic model that describes event states and the probability based potential 
transitions between states. 
a. State Transition Diagram 
This model uses the state transition diagram presented in Figure 25. The states are 
either transitional or final. Transitional states are intermediate states used to determine 
probabilities for and times until reaching the final states. States 1 through 5 constitute the 
Find, Fix, and Track components of the traditional F2T2EA kill chain. States 6, 7, and 8 
correspond to the Target component of the kill chain. State 6 is for threat evaluation and 
weapons assignment (TEWA), where the determination is made to either employ USV or 
SAG ship subsystems to engage the threat, and states 7 and 8 reflect targeting with the 
appropriate response subsystem onboard the SAG and USV. State 7 also includes Engage 
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and Assess portions of the kill chain for the SAG and was not used in this study. This is 
because the model was developed to incorporate the option for SAG responses in addition 
to USV responses, but only the USV defensive measures were explored to meet the study 
goals. 
States 9, 11, 13, 15, and 17 comprise the USV’s Engage component of the F2T2EA 
kill chain. Three different range rings centered around the USV are used for this part of the 
model. These range rings are labeled as “RR” in Figure 25 as well as in following tables. 
When the threat missile is only inside Range Ring 1, SAMs are used to engage the threat. 
When the threat closes to be within Range Ring 2, electronic attack is employed, and range 
ring 3 comprises CIWS and soft-kill deception countermeasure engagements. 
States 10, 12, 14, and 16 constitute the assess component of the F2T2EA kill chain. 
In states 2, 3, or 4, the target can be lost, requiring a transition back to state 1 “Search” for 
the USV to reacquire the threat. In states, 10, 12, 14, or 16, the battle damage assessment 
can indicate the target has not been destroyed, requiring a transition back to state 1 for the 
USV to begin another kill chain sequence. States 18, 19, and 20 are the model’s three final 
states: Hard Kill, Soft Kill, or No Kill. The model completes when a final state is reached. 
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Figure 25.  State Transition Diagram 
b. Scenarios Used in Kill Chain Analysis 
The kill chain analysis evaluates four different scenarios: 
1. The medium threat ASCM traveling at cruise speed in OPSIT 1A 
2. The medium threat ASCM traveling at cruise speed in OPSIT 1B 
3. The high threat ASCM traveling at terminal speed in OPSIT 1B 
4. The medium threat ASCM traveling at cruise speed in OPSIT 1B only 
engaged with SAMs (i.e., without Range Ring 2 or Range Ring 3) 
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The low threat ASCM was not used for this model due to having both a lower cruise 
speed and a lower terminal speed than the other two threat levels. It is assumed the USV 
will perform equally or better against this lower level threat. The medium threat was chosen 
for the majority of the modeling due to the threat having the highest cruise speed, and the 
high threat was chosen in order to represent the worst-case scenario where the incoming 
ASCM is already at terminal speed when detected. In all scenarios for this model, if an 
incoming threat is detected by the USV, the SAG must provide authorization for the USV 
to employ countermeasures during the Networked TEWA state.  
Each range ring in the model represents specific response options the USV will 
employ. The range rings are time-based, commensurate with the ASCM’s position along 
its threat axis as it continues inbound. The times associated with how long it takes an 
incoming threat to reach the SAG are calculated based on a time-speed-distance analysis 
using the cruise speed of Mach 0.9 for the medium threat and the high threat terminal speed 
of Mach 2.9, with the maximum USV detection range in each case as the starting distance. 
This range was determined from Equation 1, using a USV antenna height of 12 meters and 
an ASCM height of 20 meters for the medium threat and five meters for the high threat, 
based on ASCM cruise and terminal heights. 
Figure 26 displays Scenario 1, which is based on OPSIT 1A where the USV is 
offset from the incoming threat missile. In this scenario, the USV is only able to engage 
the ASCM once within Range Ring 1. 
63 
 
Figure 26.  Scenario 1—Based on OPSIT 1A 
Figure 27 displays Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, which are based on OPSIT 1B where 
an ASCM is passing overhead the USV on its way to the SAG. The ASCM passes through 
each of the three range rings, which are split into the front half and back half. The front 
half encompasses the situation where the USV is between the ASCM and the SAG and the 
ASCM is within the range rings. The back half refers to the situation where the ASCM has 
passed the USV and is within the range rings between the USV and the SAG. 
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Figure 27.  Scenarios 2 and 3—Based on OPSIT 1B 
Figure 28 displays Scenario 4, which is based on OPSIT 1B with Range Ring 2 and 
Range Ring 3 removed. This scenario was used to evaluate USV threat response with only 
SAMs by removing the EW, soft-kill countermeasure, and CIWS response options. 
 
Figure 28.  Scenario 4—Based on OPSIT 1B with Range Ring 1 Only 
2. Kill Chain Model Inputs 
The Markov kill chain model was developed using the following assumptions:  
1. The USV is not targeted in the scenarios. 
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2. The USV is in a defensive mode only. 
3. Each response subsystem onboard the USV is assigned to a range ring, 
with multiple systems able to be assigned to the same range ring. 
4. The SAG and its units are counted as a single target. 
5. Given the speeds of the missiles relative to the USV and SAG, the USV 
and SAG shall be considered stationary for the purposes of this model. 
6. ASCMs are launched from sanctuary (maximum distance), so low and 
medium threats will be detected after they have reached cruise speed and 
altitude, while the high threat will be detected only after reaching its 
terminal speed and altitude. 
7. SAM effectiveness is equivalent on both sides of the USV. 
8. The USV and SAG are both in battle-ready state (equipment and systems 
onboard the USV and SAG are available, energized, and not 
malfunctioning, and system operators are awake and alert). 
Using the state transition diagram, a state machine was developed in Microsoft 
Excel to analyze the scenarios. Probabilities were assigned to each transition between states 
based on previous research, unclassified data, and estimation. Table 2 uses the states and 
transitions identified in Figure 25 and shows the possible transitions from each state and 
the associated probabilities of transition. The far-left column displays the state that is being 
transitioned out of. The following columns on the same row show the possible states that 
can be transitioned to, and the probabilities for each transition are shown in bold font. This 
table was used to develop the probabilities for reaching the three final states. 
For example, from the Search state, there is a 99% probability of transitioning to 
the Detect state and a 1% chance of transitioning to the final No Kill state (meaning the 
track was never gained and therefore could not be engaged). After transitioning to the 
Detect state, there is a 99% probability of transitioning to the Track state and a 1% of losing 
the target and therefore returning to the Search state. These transition probabilities continue 
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until a final state is reached. All the states in Table 2 transition in this style with exception 
of State 8 Determine Response. To transition from this state, a determination is made as to 
which range ring response is appropriate based on how close the incoming ASCM threat 
is to the USV. In a given situation, the overall probability for reaching the final state is the 
product of the previously realized probabilities. The full state machine models for the 
scenarios can be viewed in Appendix B. 
Table 2.   Machine States and Transition Probabilities. Adapted from 
Smith (2010) and Giachetti (2015). 
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Neither the amount of time spent in each state nor the corresponding distributions 
could be determined from supporting literature, so best estimates for the average state times 
were used in a normal distribution. The primary defined input was the mean time in each 
state, and it was desired to have the modeled time evenly distributed about the mean rather 
than using a skewed distribution. A standard deviation of 10% was used for all non-human 
dependent state times, and a standard deviation of 25% was used for states requiring 
operator interactions. 
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For instance, it is assumed it takes two seconds on average, with a standard 
deviation about that mean of 0.2 seconds, for the USV to detect an incoming ASCM threat 
because of the time for the software to establish enough consistent data on the threat to rule 
out clutter. The only state requiring operator interaction was state 6 “Networked TEWA,” 
during which a SAG operator gives the USV authorization to employ threat responses. 
These state times and their associated standard deviations are displayed in Table 3. States 
18, 19, and 20 are the possible end states for the state machine. These states represent the 
final battle damage assessment from the USV’s perspective when the USV has either 
physically destroyed the ASCM (hard kill), managed to force the ASCM to miss its target 
(soft kill), or failed to defeat the ASCM resulting in it penetrating to the SAG self-defense 
area (no kill). 
Table 3.   Machine State Times and Standard Deviations 










1. Search  1  No 0.1  
2. Detect  2  No 0.2  
3. Track  2  No 0.2  
4. Identify  1  No 0.1  
5. Track Shared  1  No 0.1  
6. Networked TEWA  4  Yes 1.0  
7. SAG Response  0 N/A 0.0 
8. Determine Response  1  No 0.1  
9. Respond RR 1  4  No 0.4  
10. Assess RR 1 Engagement  1  No 0.1  
11. Respond RR 2  5  No 0.5  
12. Assess RR 2 Engagement  1  No 0.1  
13. Respond RR 3  5  No 0.5  
14. Assess RR 3 Engagement  1  No 0.1  
15. Respond RR 2 Backhalf  5  No 0.5  
16. Assess RR 2 Backhalf Engagement  1  No 0.1  
17. Respond RR 1 Backhalf  8  No 0.8  
18. Hard Kill  0  N/A 0.0  
19. Soft Kill  0  N/A 0.0  
20. No Kill  0  N/A 0.0  
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3. Kill Chain Model Execution 
In the kill chain analysis, the metrics of interest are the amounts of hard kills, soft 
kills, and failed engagements (no kills) of the incoming ASCM. Using the state time 
distributions shown in Table 3, the model calculates the time it takes for each state 
transition to occur. This allows for an estimate of available engagement time for the range 
rings for the medium threat—the CSS-N-8—and the high threat—the SS-N-27. As shown 
in Table 1, the CSS-N-8 has the greatest cruise speed so it was used in the state machine 
for an ASCM moving at cruise speed. Similarly, the SS-N-27 was used in the state machine 
for an ASCM moving at terminal speed. In order to determine the state that is transitioned 
to, a random number is generated between zero and one. 
This random number is used to determine the next state by comparing it against the 
cumulative probabilities of the possible transition states, derived from Table 2. If the 
random number is equal to or less than the probability for the first possible state transition, 
that transition is made. If it is greater, it is compared against the next possible transition, 
and so on, until a transition is determined. 
As an example, once in state 10 “Assess RR1 Engagement,” the possible transitions 
are to state 18 “Hard Kill,” state 11 “Respond RR2,” or state 1 “Search.” The probabilities 
for these transitions are 0.82, 0.13, and 0.05, respectively. Therefore, if the random number 
generated is 0.82 or less, the transition to state 18 “Hard Kill” will occur, and the model 
will complete since that state is a final state. If, however, the random number generated is 
greater than 0.82, it will evaluate for the next possible transition—to state 11 “Respond 
RR2”—which would occur if the random number is greater than 0.82 but less than or equal 
to 0.95. Finally, if the random number is greater than 0.95, the transition to state 1 “Search” 
will occur. 
The model uses logic that determines the response the USV will be capable of 
making. This occurs during state 8 “Determine Response.” Using ASCM time-based 
position versus the current cumulative state hold time, the USV is forced to transition to 
the appropriate range ring response. The potential for some state transitions are eliminated 
based on the total elapsed run time, precluding transitions to ineligible states. For example, 
71 
if the current elapsed time is 9.5 seconds when the model reaches state 8, then the ASCM 
will be past the RR1 engagement zone, and state 8 will be forced to transition directly to 
state 11 “Respond RR2.” Similarly, if a kill chain execution has been returned from the 
“Respond RR2” state to “Search,” it is not then able to enter “Respond RR1” based on 
elapsed time, because the ASCM has already passed through the front half of Range Ring 
1. 
Using Real Options Valuation’s statistical modeling and simulation tool Risk 
Simulator, a Monte Carlo simulation with 5000 trials for each scenario was executed for 
the Markov Kill Chain model. For these trials, the mean state times and their distributions 
serve as input assumptions and the final state of each run—hard kill, soft kill, or no kill—
serves as the output forecast. This resulted in data being collected showing the number of 
runs that ended in each final state over 5000 runs for the medium threat ASCM traveling 
at cruise speed in OPSIT 1A (Scenario 1), the medium threat ASCM traveling at cruise 
speed in OPSIT 1B (Scenario 2), the high threat ASCM traveling at terminal speed in 
OPSIT 1B (Scenario 3), and the medium threat ASCM traveling at cruise speed in OPSIT 
1B without Range Ring 2 and Range Ring 3 for engagement (Scenario 4). 
4. Kill Chain Model Results and Analysis 
Table 4 displays the results of Scenario 1, Scenario 2, and Scenario 4 in numerical 
and percentage values.  
Table 4.   Results of Markov Kill Chain Analysis Scenarios 1, 2, and 







w/o RR 2&3 
Scenario 4 
Hard Kills 4030 81% 2467 49% 4064 81% 
Soft Kills 0 0% 2108 42% 0 0% 
No Kill 970 19% 425 9% 936 19% 
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Figure 29 displays the total percentage of hard kills and soft kills for Scenario 1, 
which was OPSIT 1A with a medium threat at cruise speed, versus Scenario 2, which was 
OPSIT 1B with a medium threat at cruise speed. There are no soft kills in Scenario 1 
because the ASCM does not pass through Range Ring 2 or Range Ring 3, so the USV is 
only able to engage with SAMs. In Scenario 2, when the USV is able to respond with soft-
kill deception countermeasures and EA, roughly 10% more threats are defeated. 
 
Figure 29.  USV Percentage of Kills in Scenarios 1 and 2 (5000 Runs) 
Figure 30 displays the percentage of hard kills and soft kills for Scenario 2, which 
was OPSIT 1B with a medium threat at cruise speed, versus Scenario 4, which was the 
same as Scenario 2 except with Range Ring 2 and Range Ring 3 removed. There are no 
soft kills in Scenario 4 because the USV does not respond with soft-kill deception 
countermeasures or EA. The USV is able to engage with SAMs on the front half and the 
back half in both of these scenarios. Again, the scenario where the USV employs both hard-
kill and soft-kill methods proves more effective by approximately 10%. 
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Figure 30.  USV Percentage of Kills in Scenarios 2 and 4 (5000 Runs) 
Scenario 3, the high threat at terminal speed, was also completed in the model. The 
results of this model indicated that at the time state 6 “Networked TEWA” was 
completed—representing when the SAG provided authorization to the USV to respond—
the ASCM had already passed through all the range rings around the USV. The ASCM was 
therefore un-engageable by the USV, so no response options were employed. In terms of 
the metric of interest, there were 100% no kills (zero successful engagements).  
In Scenario 1 and Scenario 4, the USV successfully engaged the threat 81% of the 
time, and in Scenario 2, the USV successfully engaged the threat 91% of the time. These 
kill chain analysis results therefore show the USV would provide the SAG with a defensive 
advantage against the medium threat ASCM. 
B. USV CUEING TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
1. Time Series Analysis Description 
Positioning the USV as a forward sensor platform is expected to offer the SAG 
additional time to react to inbound missile threats by having the USV serve as an early 
warning system. If the USV detects the missile, the SAG can be expected to receive alerts 
from the USV. This is especially useful since the proposed USV platform can provide 
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target tracks to the SAG, enabling the SAG to fire beyond its organic detection distance, 
or radar horizon. For the purposes of this assessment, the rules of engagement are assumed 
to permit firing on over-the-horizon inbound missile threats. 
Figure 31 presents the baseline case of a SAG against a missile threat without any 
USVs. Figure 32 displays OPSIT 2A, in which there is a SAG with a USV stationed off 
the threat axis such that it can only identify inbound threats tangential to its maximum 
detection range. This represents the minimal early warning benefit early detection scenario. 
Figure 33, on the other hand, represents the maximum benefit early detection scenario, 
where the USV is stationed on the threat axis with the inbound threat ASCM passing 
directly overhead the USV, as prescribed by OPSIT 2B. 
 




Figure 32.  Topdown View of ASCM Threat against SAG—OPSIT 2A 
 
 
Figure 33.  Topdown View of ASCM Threat against SAG—OPSIT 2B 
 
In each of these situations, the SAG is modeled as a single point. The circles around 
the USV and the SAG represent the detection range rings for their onboard detection 
systems. In Figure 32 and Figure 33, the “Distance Between USV + SAG” is the straight-
line distance measurement between the USV’s position and the SAG’s position. The 
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“Effective Distance Between USV + SAG” is the straight-line separation between the USV 
and the SAG along the threat axis. For OPSIT 2A, the threat axis is tangential to the USV’s 
maximum detection range. Thus, the effective USV to SAG distance is one side of the 
triangle formed by the USV detection range and the distance between the USV and SAG. 
The effective distance between units is not displayed for OPSIT 2B because the USV is on 
the threat axis in that scenario, so the effective distance is therefore equal to the “Distance 
Between USV + SAG”. 
Similarly, the “USV Effective Detection Distance” is the separation between the 
USV and the point of ASCM detection by USV sensors measured along the threat axis. In 
OPSIT 2A, there is no separation along the threat axis between the USV position and the 
point of ASCM detection by its sensors, so the effective USV detection distance is equal 
to zero. In OPSIT 2B, the USV effective detection distance is afforded by the entirety of 
the radius of the USV detection range. This is the maximum early warning benefit scenario. 
The effective early warning benefit depends on the detection made in the baseline 
case due to the SAG’s organic sensors, the effective distance between the USV and the 
SAG, and the USV effective detection distance. Since the effective USV detection distance 
is reduced to zero in OPSIT 2A, the early warning benefit is attributed solely to the 
effective distance between the USV and SAG minus the detection made in the baseline 
case. For OPSIT 2B, the early warning benefit is attributed to removing the baseline case 
detection from the sum of the effective USV detection distance and the effective distance 
between the USV and SAG. 
For each of the scenarios in this model, an assessment of the time from initial 
detection until the ASCM reaches the SAG was made for each of the three threat missiles. 
The times obtained from analyzing the USV scenarios were compared against the baseline 
case, and the resulting early detection times were then used to quantitatively assess whether 
this early detection afforded by screening USVs provided the SAG with extra counter-fire 
opportunities and was therefore tactically relevant. 
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2. Time Series Analysis Inputs 
To begin the assessment, assumptions were made consistent with performance 
information for the threat missiles. Missile flight profile altitudes of 20 meters for cruise 
and five meters for terminal were based on data common to all three missiles (Jane’s by 
IHS Markit 2018a, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018h). Information about cruise to 
terminal transition standoff distances from their targets as well as information regarding 
presence of terminal pop-up maneuvers could not be identified in the unclassified research. 
The cruise to terminal mode transition standoff distance assumptions were therefore made 
based on educated guess, and threat ASCMs were treated as targets proceeding straight 
inbound at terminal altitude (five meters) and speed with no additional pop-up or zig-zag 
maneuvers. For each missile, the transition from cruise to terminal mode is treated as an 
instantaneous event. 
The following list summarizes these assumptions: 
1. Each missile operates in a sea-skimming mode following transition to 
cruise. 
2. The cruise altitude of each sea-skimming missile is 20 meters (Jane’s by 
IHS Markit 2018a, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018h). 
3. The terminal altitude of each sea-skimming missile is five meters (Jane’s 
by IHS Markit 2018a, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018h). 
4. The low-missile threat, C-704, and the medium missile threat, CSS-N-8 
Saccade, maintain their cruise speeds—Mach 0.875 and Mach 0.9, 
respectively (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018c, 2018d, 2018f, 2018h). 
5. The high missile threat, SS-N-27 Sizzler, has a terminal supersonic speed 
of Mach 2.9 (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018a). 
6. The low and medium threats have an assumed transition from cruise to 
terminal modes 10 nautical miles (18.52 kilometers) from their target. 
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7. The high missile threat has an assumed transition from cruise to terminal 
modes 20 nautical miles (37.04 kilometers) from its target. 
Given the cruise and terminal altitudes of the threat missile sea-skimming profiles, 
the USV and SAG detection distances could be derived from Equation 1, the simplified 
radar horizon equation against a target at elevation in metric units. Utilizing the earlier 
assumption that the USV radar height is 12 meters and given the threat missile profile 
altitudes of 20 meters cruise altitude and five meters terminal altitude (Jane’s by IHS 
Markit 2018a, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018h), the resultant USV maximum detection 
range is 33 kilometers for missiles in cruise mode and 24 kilometers for missiles in terminal 
mode. Threat missile cruise and terminal profile altitudes were treated as constants in this 
analysis, and USV radar height will be further explored. 
Assumptions were made about the probability of the SAG and USV detecting 
ASCMs at these maximum detection ranges based upon Smith’s 2010 thesis “Using Kill-
Chain Analysis to Develop Surface Ship CONOPs To Defend Against Anti-Ship Cruise 
Missiles.” In his analysis, Smith evaluated characteristics of 19 missiles and determined 
the probability for the targeted ship to detect the ASCM was greater than 0.995 at the radar 
range horizon (2010). Further, 16 of his 19 missiles had at least a 0.999 probability of 
detection (Smith 2010). Based on these findings, this time series analysis model assumes 
a 100% probability of detection at the maximum detection distances for simplicity. 
To implement the model, the following input variables were identified: 
1. Blue Forces: Distance between USV and SAG 
2. Blue Forces: USV Antenna Height 
3. Blue Forces: SAG Antenna Height 
The following inputs were also identified but set as constants in this analysis: 
1. Red Forces: Low Missile Threat (C-704) Cruise to Terminal Distance 
from Target 
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2. Red Forces: Medium Missile Threat (YJ-83 or CSS-N-8) Cruise to 
Terminal Distance from Target 
3. Red Forces: High Missile Threat (3M-54 or SS-N-27) Cruise to Terminal 
Distance from Target 
The combination of known threat missile speeds, calculated blue force detection 
distances, and assumed USV to SAG standoff distances was determined to be sufficient to 
calculate assessed total detection time for OPSITs 2A, 2B, and the baseline case of the 
SAG without a USV screen. An example of inputs for this time-distance based model is 
presented in Table 5, where variable inputs are highlighted in gray, constants are typed in 
bold, and calculations based on the variable inputs and constants are shown normally, with 
no highlight or text effects. The missile cruise to terminal distance input variables were 
held constant throughout this analysis but could serve as independent variables in future 
analyses. All standoff distances are given in nautical miles (NM) and converted into 
kilometers (km) using the conversion constants. 
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Table 5.   Example USV Cueing Time Series Analysis Model Inputs 
 
 
3. Time Series Analysis Model Execution 
In the evaluation of each scenario against all three missile threats, the metric of 
interest is total time-to-SAG. Time-to-SAG is a representation in seconds of the amount of 
missile flight time from the first detection by any system to the point where the missile 
reaches the logical center of the SAG, synonymous with a missile hit. 
For the baseline SAG-only scenario, the time-to-SAG metric is calculated by 
assessing the missile speed against the SAG organic detection distance. For the OPSIT 2A 
off axis scenario, the total time-to-SAG is calculated by assessing the missile speed against 
the effective USV to SAG distance as in Figure 32. This scenario represents a detection 
scenario with the least amount of early warning benefit to the SAG. If the effective USV 
to SAG distance is less than the SAG organic detection distance, the latter is used to assess 
the time-to-SAG calculation because the early warning benefit will be zero seconds in that 
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case. The USV detection range for OPSIT 2A scenarios will be based on threat missiles in 
cruise profiles. 
The rationale for this is based on the geometries presented in Figure 34. Minimal 
early warning in OPSIT 2A requires that the USV detection occur at the tangent of its 
maximum detection range. If the missile is detected while in its cruise phase, the detection 
range is greater than the detection range associated with the terminal phase missile. If the 
distance between the USV and the SAG is held constant, this scenario results in a 
counterintuitive result that the effective distance between the USV and SAG is greater 
when the detection ring is smaller and the missile is in its terminal phase. As the desired 
result is to determine the minimal early warning time, the effective distance between the 
USV and SAG in this evaluation will be based on cruise phase derived detection rings and 
the resulting smaller effective distances.  
 
Figure 34.  Topdown View of ASCM USV Detection Ranges in OPSIT 2A 
For the OPSIT 2B on-axis scenario, the missile speed is assessed against the USV 
detection distance and the USV to SAG distance as in Figure 33. If the total effective USV 
early detection distance falls inside the SAG organic detection distance, the latter is used 
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to assess the time-to-SAG calculation. This would represent a situation with no early 
warning benefit. 
For each of the three scenarios, the threat missile transition from cruise to terminal 
mode is accounted for in terms of USV and SAG detection ranges as missile altitude 
changes. In the case of a terminal boost, such as the high threat SS-N-27 Sizzler, the model 
treats the transition from a lower cruise speed to the higher terminal speed as an 
instantaneous event, though in reality there is a lag. 
The model results for the set of inputs given in Table 5 are presented in Table 6. 
These results reflect the time, rounded to the nearest second, between the first detection by 
any ship and the time the missile will hit the SAG. Results are displayed for OPSITs 2A, 
2B, and the baseline case against the three threat missiles. The yellow highlighted 2A-
Baseline Benefit and 2B-Baseline Benefit columns present the differences between the 
OPSITs and the baseline, which serve as the early warning detection benefit afforded by 
the USV in either OPSIT. The early warning detection benefit is a combination of the 
effective USV detection range and the effective USV distance from the SAG minus the 
SAG detection range. For example, in the case of the low threat missile for inputs specified 
in Table 5, OPSIT 2B presents 263 seconds of total detection time. Removing the 118 
seconds of organic SAG detection time shows that the USV offers a net 145 seconds of 
early warning detection time benefit against the low threat missile in OPSIT 2B. 
Table 6.   Early Detection Benefit Outputs for Inputs from Table 5 
 
 
Missile Threat OPSIT 2A OPSIT 2B Baseline 2A-Baseline Benefit 2B-Baseline Benefit
Low 118 263 118 0 145
Medium 115 256 115 0 141
High 33 190 26 7 164
Total Transit Time After Initial Detection (in seconds)
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4. Time Series Analysis Results 
The USV-SAG distance and USV antenna height inputs were separately varied to 
explore the relationship between those inputs and the early warning benefit. As the USV-
SAG distance was varied in the model, the USV antenna height was kept constant at 12 
meters. This value was selected by taking two thirds of the given SAG antenna height of 
17 meters. As USV antenna height was varied, the USV-SAG distance was kept constant 
at 25 nautical miles, which was selected to place the USV just over five nautical miles 
outside the SAG detection distance for missiles in their cruise phase. 
The relationship of these input variables against the metric of interest—early 
warning detection time—is illustrated in Figure 35 and Figure 36. Each chart shows clear 
delineations in OPSIT results for the given relationship, with OPSIT 2B providing a 
distinct advantage in early warning detection time. 
Figure 35 shows the early warning detection time compared to the USV-SAG 
distance has immediate benefit in OPSIT 2B and benefit in OPSIT 2A starting at a 25 NM 
distance between the USV and SAG. This inflection point is a result of the USV detection 
distance surpassing that of the organic SAG detection range. 
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Figure 35.  Early Warning Detection versus USV-SAG Distance 
Figure 36 displays the early warning detection time compared to the USV antenna 
height. The USV antenna height has a direct effect on the USV detection distance. For the 
missiles against the OPSIT 2B scenarios, as the antenna height and detection distance 
increase, so does the early warning detection time as one might expect. Counterintuitively, 
as the antenna height and detection distance increase, the OPSIT 2A scenarios display a 
decline in USV early warning detection distance. This is a result of the geometries 
described in Figure 34. The OPSIT 2A scenario is the minimal early warning benefit with 
detection occurring just as the missile passes tangentially to the maximum USV detection 
range. In order to maintain this with the USV-SAG distance held constant, the effective 
distance between the USV and the SAG decreases as the USV antenna height and detection 
distance increase, resulting in lower early detection times. 
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Figure 36.  Early Warning Detection versus USV Antenna Height 
From the analysis described, it can be concluded that a forward-positioned USV 
can provide the SAG an increased reaction time to respond to the missiles. To better 
quantify the above findings and determine if this increased reaction time is tactically 
relevant to the SAG, Smith’s (2010) methodology was again leveraged. 
In his work, Smith describes 19 different missiles of varying capabilities and their 
assessed effectiveness against a notional surface ship equipped with long-range and short-
range SAMs and a CIWS (Smith 2010). Of particular interest to this study is Smith’s 
timeline analysis of counter-fire shot opportunities from the ship against the threat missiles 
in his “Table 4.  Line diagram range results” (Smith 2010, 28). An adapted version of this 
table is presented in Table 7. In this table, columns R1 through R8 represent counter-fire 
opportunities from a SAM launching unit. The data inside column R1 represents the 
intercept range in kilometers for the first SAM launched against the threat missile. R2 is 
the intercept range for the second, and so on. Some shot opportunities, however, will not 
be viable due to the threat missile being beyond the radar horizon range. These are shaded 
in gray. For example, against the CSS-N-8 Saccade, the platform has seven columns 
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populated with data (R1–R7) but can only realize three counter-fire opportunities since 
R1–R4 are beyond the radar horizon and shaded gray. 
Table 7.   Ship Counter-fire Shot Opportunities against ASCMs by 
Range (km). Adapted from Smith (2010). 
 
 
To make these assessments, Smith considered missile factors such as speed, radar 
cross section and the resultant detectability, and cruise altitude. Smith also included the 
SS-N-27 Sizzler missile in his study. From the matching row, it is shown that Smith 
assessed seven shot opportunities against it at the ranges in kilometers specified in columns 
R1 through R7. Only three shot opportunities are assessed to be within the radar horizon 
meaning that the missile is detectable and can be counter-fired upon. In the case of a lower 
capability missile like the SS-N-22 Sunburn (Kh-41), only three total shot opportunities 
are assessed with two being within the radar horizon. 
Using Smith’s framework, the early warning detection times afforded by the USV 
can be introduced and ship or SAG counter-fire impacts can be assessed. Providing the 
ship or SAG additional early warning detection will effectively push back the radar horizon 
allowing for more counter-fire opportunities. This will correspond to the gray shaded area 
Shots by Range (km)
Missile Version R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
Exocet MM38 32 23 16 9 5
Exocet SM39 42 38 19 12 8
Exocet MM40 56 40 30 20 14 8
Exocet AM39 56 40 30 20 14 8
Harpoon RGM‐84 103 78 55 39 25 18 9
Harpoon UGM‐84 103 78 55 39 25 18 9
Harpoon AGM84 140 99 74 55 40 28 10
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 74 55 41 31 22 14 9 4
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 22 7
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 122 80 65 42 26 19 8
Saccade C‐802 CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 84 55 40 30 20 12 9
Saccade C‐802 CAS‐8 97 72 54 38 29 20 14 8
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 33 23 15 9 4
Styx SS‐N‐2D 73 54 39 28 19 11 7
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 55 23 7
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 51 20 6
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 98 80 55 40 30 20 11 7
BrahMos PJ‐10 160 75 48 23
RBS‐15 Mk2 RBS‐15 153 116 82 64 45 36 24 16
Radar Horizon
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in Table 7 moving to the left (un-shading a previously shaded cell), denoting more shot 
opportunities available to the SAG compared to a no-USV scenario. An increased number 
of shot opportunities will thus reveal the utility of the USV-SAG cueing in a quantifiable 
manner. 
To assess these shot opportunities against the early warning detection timelines 
afforded by the USV, the range-based shot opportunities must be translated into time-based 
shot opportunities. Using Smith’s missile speeds in his “Table 24.  RCS and probability of 
detection computations for several ASCMs at 167 km and at their radar horizon,” the speed 
of each missile is calculated in kilometers per second as presented in Table 8 and applied 
to Table 7 to produce the time-based shot opportunities chart presented in Table 9 (Smith 
2010, 55). Table 9 therefore depicts the number of shot opportunities in columns R1–R8 
with the time-to-SAG entered in each cell where there is a shot opportunity, provided 
detection occurs. Cells shaded in gray again represent when the missile is beyond the radar 
horizon, and therefore not detected, so the shot opportunity is lost. 
Table 8.   Smith’s Missile Speeds Calculated in Kilometers per 
Second. Adapted from Smith (2010). 
 
 
Missile Version Speed (Mach) km/s
Exocet MM38 0.9 0.3087
Exocet SM39 0.9 0.3087
Exocet MM40 0.9 0.3087
Exocet AM39 0.9 0.3087
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.8 0.2744
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.8 0.2744
Harpoon AGM84 0.8 0.2744
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.8 0.2744
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 2.5 0.8575
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.9 0.3087
Saccade C‐802 CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.9 0.3087
Saccade C‐802 CAS‐8 0.9 0.3087
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.9 0.3087
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.9 0.3087
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 3 1.029
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 3 1.029
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.8 0.2744
BrahMos PJ‐10 2 0.686
RBS‐15 Mk2 RBS‐15 0.9 0.3087
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Table 9.   Ship Counter-fire Shot Opportunities against ASCMs by 
Time (Seconds). Adapted from Smith (2010). 
 
 
From these time-based shot opportunities, the impacts of early warning afforded by 
the USV can be assessed. The three threat missiles in this study were characterized as low, 
medium, and high threat missiles based on their relative capabilities with focus on speed 
and range. The 19 missiles in Smith’s study can be similarly binned based their 
performance characteristics for range, speed, and detectability. For each missile in Smith’s 
study, the metric of interest was compared against the population, and three equal sized 
bins were created covering the span of the worst to best performing characteristics. For 
each metric, missiles who met the top performing bin criteria were awarded one point, the 
middle third were awarded two points, and the bottom third were awarded three points. As 
such, low points indicate a higher threat missile. Metric scores by missile were tallied for 
a total missile score range from 4–9, resulting in missiles being assessed as a high threat 
with a score of 4–5, a medium threat with a score of 6–7, and low threat with a final score 
of 8–9. Smith’s original 19 missiles assessed against low, medium, and high threat bins are 
presented in Table 10. 
Shots by Time (s)
Missile Version T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8
Exocet MM38 104 75 52 29 16
Exocet SM39 136 123 62 39 26
Exocet MM40 181 130 97 65 45 26
Exocet AM39 181 130 97 65 45 26
Harpoon RGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33
Harpoon UGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33
Harpoon AGM84 510 361 270 200 146 102 36
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 270 200 149 113 80 51 33 15
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 26 8
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 395 259 211 136 84 62 26
Saccade C‐802 CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 272 178 130 97 65 39 29
Saccade C‐802 CAS‐8 314 233 175 123 94 65 45 26
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 107 75 49 29 13
Styx SS‐N‐2D 236 175 126 91 62 36 23
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 53 22 7
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 50 19 6
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 357 292 200 146 109 73 40 26
BrahMos PJ‐10 233 109 70 34
RBS‐15 Mk2 RBS‐15 496 376 266 207 146 117 78 52
Gray Denotes Missed Opportunies due to Missile Being Beyond Radar Horizon
Radar Horizon
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Table 10.   Low, Medium, and High Threat Binning Applied to 
Missiles from Smith’s Analysis 
 
 
With the Smith missiles assessed in terms of low, medium, and high threats, the 
USV cueing early warning detection times calculated in the OPSIT 2A and OPSIT 2B 
models could be incorporated into the baseline time-based counter-fire shot opportunities 
chart from Table 9, using the following input parameters: 
1. Distance Between USV and SAG: 25 NM 
2. USV Antenna Height: 12 meters 
3. SAG Antenna Height: 17 meters 
The counter-fire opportunities were thus updated to include USV cueing and 
reassessed. The results for OPSIT 2A are shown in Table 11, and those for OPSIT 2B are 
in Table 12. The early warning detection time benefits, in seconds, is displayed for each 
missile in the far-right column in these tables. Note there are no additional counter-fire shot 
opportunities against any missile in OPSIT 2A, as shown by comparing Tables 9 and 11, 
but there are several additional shot opportunities in OPSIT 2B as presented by comparing 
Missile Version Range Bin Radar Horizon Bin Speed Bin Score Assessed Threat
Exocet MM38 3 1 3 7 Medium
Exocet MM40 3 1 3 7 Medium
Exocet SM39 3 1 3 7 Medium
Exocet AM39 3 1 3 7 Medium
Harpoon RGM‐84 2 1 3 6 Medium
Harpoon UGM‐84 2 1 3 6 Medium
Harpoon AGM84 1 1 3 5 High
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 3 3 3 9 Low
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 3 1 1 5 High
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 1 1 3 5 High
C‐802 [Ship]  C‐802 3 1 3 7 Medium
C‐802 [Air] C‐802(CAS‐8) 3 1 3 7 Medium
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 3 2 3 8 Low
Styx SS‐N‐2 3 2 3 8 Low
Sunburn (3M‐80E) [A] SS‐N‐22 3 2 1 6 Medium
Sunburn (Kh‐41) [A,D] SS‐N‐22 3 1 1 5 High
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 3 1 3 7 Medium
BrahMos PJ‐10 1 1 2 4 High
RBS‐15 RBS‐15 2 1 3 6 Medium
Smith Thesis Missile Chart Low is Good
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Tables 9 and 12. This is most easily observed by the reduced number of gray shaded boxes 
indicating that fewer shot opportunities are beyond the radar horizon, and additional 
counter-fire opportunities are therefore available. 
Table 11.   Ship Counter-fire Shot Opportunities by Time against 




OPSIT 2A (all value are in seconds)
Missile Version T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 From Missile Info Tab 2A Benefit (s)
Exocet MM38 104 75 52 29 16 Medium 0
Exocet SM39 136 123 62 39 26 Medium 0
Exocet MM40 181 130 97 65 45 26 Medium 0
Exocet AM39 181 130 97 65 45 26 Medium 0
Harpoon RGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33 Medium 0
Harpoon UGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33 Medium 0
Harpoon AGM84 510 361 270 200 146 102 36 High 7
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 270 200 149 113 80 51 33 15 Low 0
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 26 8 High 7
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 395 259 211 136 84 62 26 High 7
Saccade C‐802 CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 272 178 130 97 65 39 29 Medium 0
Saccade C‐802 CAS‐8 314 233 175 123 94 65 45 26 Medium 0
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 107 75 49 29 13 Low 0
Styx SS‐N‐2D 236 175 126 91 62 36 23 Low 0
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 53 22 7 Medium 0
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 50 19 6 High 7
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 357 292 200 146 109 73 40 26 Medium 0
BrahMos PJ‐10 233 109 70 34 High 7
RBS‐15 Mk2 RBS‐15 496 376 266 207 146 117 78 52 Medium 0
Gray Denotes Missed Opportunies due to Missile Being Beyond Radar Horizon
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Table 12.   Ship Counter-fire Shot Opportunities by Time against 
ASCMs with OPSIT 2B Benefits Considered (USV-SAG Distance = 25 NM) 
For example, the baseline case in Table 9 shows two viable counter-fire 
opportunities against an inbound RGM-84 Harpoon in columns T6 and T7, at 66 and 33 
seconds, respectively, prior to the missile impacting the ship. The RGM-84 is assessed to 
be a medium threat per Table 10, and at a USV-SAG spacing of 25 NM in OPSIT 2B, it 
presents 141 seconds of early warning benefit per Table 12. This table also shows five 
viable shot opportunities against the RGM-84 in columns T3–T7, at 200, 142, 91, 66, and 
33 seconds, which is a benefit of three additional shot opportunities compared to the 
baseline in Table 9. These times corresponding with each shot opportunity are the same in 
Table 9, but the engagements at 200, 142, and 91 seconds are outside the radar horizon in 
that scenario, and therefore not viable opportunities. 
Modifying only the USV-SAG spacing input from 25 NM to 30 NM, clear 
improvement in the number of shot opportunities was discovered in both OPSITs 2A and 
2B. These results are shown in Table 13 and Table 14, respectively. 
OPSIT 2B (all value are in seconds)
Missile Version T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 From Missile Info Tab 2B Benefit (s)
Exocet MM38 104 75 52 29 16 Medium 141
Exocet SM39 136 123 62 39 26 Medium 141
Exocet MM40 181 130 97 65 45 26 Medium 141
Exocet AM39 181 130 97 65 45 26 Medium 141
Harpoon RGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33 Medium 141
Harpoon UGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33 Medium 141
Harpoon AGM84 510 361 270 200 146 102 36 High 164
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 270 200 149 113 80 51 33 15 Low 145
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 26 8 High 164
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 395 259 211 136 84 62 26 High 164
Saccade C‐802 CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 272 178 130 97 65 39 29 Medium 141
Saccade C‐802 CAS‐8 314 233 175 123 94 65 45 26 Medium 141
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 107 75 49 29 13 Low 145
Styx SS‐N‐2D 236 175 126 91 62 36 23 Low 145
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 53 22 7 Medium 141
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 50 19 6 High 164
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 357 292 200 146 109 73 40 26 Medium 141
BrahMos PJ‐10 233 109 70 34 High 164
RBS‐15 Mk2 RBS‐15 496 376 266 207 146 117 78 52 Medium 141
Gray Denotes Missed Opportunies due to Missile Being Beyond Radar Horizon
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Table 13.   Ship Counter-fire Shot Opportunities by Time against 
ASCMs with OPSIT 2A Benefits Considered (USV-SAG Distance = 30 
NM) 
Table 14.   Ship Counter-fire Shot Opportunities by Time against 
ASCMs with OPSIT 2B Benefits Considered (USV-SAG Distance = 30 NM) 
In Table 15, the number of total shot opportunities is displayed for each OPSIT 
against USV-SAG ranges, assessed every five NM from 0–50 NM. This total is the 
OPSIT 2B (all value are in seconds)
Missile Version T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 From Missile Info Tab 2B Benefit (s)
Exocet MM38 104 75 52 29 16 Medium 171
Exocet SM39 136 123 62 39 26 Medium 171
Exocet MM40 181 130 97 65 45 26 Medium 171
Exocet AM39 181 130 97 65 45 26 Medium 171
Harpoon RGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33 Medium 171
Harpoon UGM‐84 375 284 200 142 91 66 33 Medium 171
Harpoon AGM84 510 361 270 200 146 102 36 High 198
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 270 200 149 113 80 51 33 15 Low 176
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 26 8 High 198
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 395 259 211 136 84 62 26 High 198
Saccade C‐802 CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 272 178 130 97 65 39 29 Medium 171
Saccade C‐802 CAS‐8 314 233 175 123 94 65 45 26 Medium 171
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 107 75 49 29 13 Low 176
Styx SS‐N‐2D 236 175 126 91 62 36 23 Low 176
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 53 22 7 Medium 171
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 50 19 6 High 198
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 357 292 200 146 109 73 40 26 Medium 171
BrahMos PJ‐10 233 109 70 34 High 198
RBS‐15 Mk2 RBS‐15 496 376 266 207 146 117 78 52 Medium 171
Gray Denotes Missed Opportunies due to Missile Being Beyond Radar Horizon
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aggregate of all viable shot opportunities for Smith’s 19 missiles and is determined by the 
count of all shot opportunities inside the radar horizon at each USV-SAG spacing interval. 
Note, the minimum number of total counter-fire opportunities as assessed by Smith and 
displayed in Table 7 is 56, and the maximum possible counter-fire opportunities is 113 if 
all shots displayed in Table 7 were within the radar horizon. 
Table 15.   Total Counter-fire Shot Opportunities Assessed against 
USV-SAG Range 
The above analysis quantifiably determines that the use of a USV as an ASCM 
screen for SAG defense is viable and tactically useful. The assessed time benefit can be 
directly translated to additional counter-fire opportunities for the SAG to engage the threat 
missiles. 
C. EVALUATION OF USV GEOMETRIES 
To evaluate prospective USV formations with respect to the SAG, the evaluation 
tool presented in Figure 37 was built to graphically depict potential formations. This tool 
was developed in Microsoft Excel using Visual Basic for Applications. The SAG is 
represented by the larger solid circle, and the USVs are depicted by the smaller solid 
circles. In the screenshot from Figure 37, the USVs are depicted in a vertical line to the left 
of the HVU. Each unit has two concentric circles enveloping them, representing detection 
ranges against ASCMs. The inner circle represents detection range when the missile is in 
its terminal phase, and the outer circle represents detection range when the missile is in 
cruise range. The ranges differ because of the different missile altitudes in each phase of 
flight, commensurate with Equation 1. 
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Figure 37.  Screenshot of USV Formation Evaluation Tool 
The purpose of this tool is to graphically display the USV-SAG formation including 
corresponding detection range rings for the single SAG and a user-defined number of 
USVs. The tool was built upon the increased SAG reaction time due to USV cueing model 
and leverages the same USV and SAG input parameters contained in that model. 
Specifically, it makes use of the inputs for USV-SAG spacing, and USV and SAG antenna 
heights to generate the detection range rings and display USV and SAG positions. In 
addition, this tool allows for user specification of USV-USV spacing as part of the 
“Settings and Input Variables” callout in Figure 37. Explicit inputs to this tool include:  
1. Number of USVs: one to any number (no maximum) 
2. Zoom Percentage: Scales the graphical output display accordingly 
3. USV Spacing (km): Inter-USV spacing 
4. USV Formation (linear or radial) 
5. SAG Detection Lines (on or off) 
Additional inputs to this tool that leverage the USV cueing model include: 
6. USV antenna height (m) 
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7. SAG antenna height (m) 
8. USV-SAG distance (NM) 
9. Threat missile cruise phase altitude (m) 
10. Threat missile terminal phase altitude (m) 
As before, detection range rings for the USV and SAG pertain to their radar range 
equation derived detection distances against missiles in cruise flight profile at 20 meters 
altitude and missiles in a terminal flight profile at five meters altitude. These detection 
ranges are presented in Table 16.  
Table 16.   Baseline Parameters for USV Formation Evaluation Tool 
 NM km 
USV to SAG Distance 25.0 46.3 
USV Cruise Detection Range 17.7 32.7 
USV Terminal Detection Range 12.7 23.5 
SAG Cruise Detection Range 19.1 35.4 
SAG Terminal Detection Range 14.2 26.2 
 
Two types of USV formations were considered. The first was a linear formation 
where the USVs form a straight screen, and the second was a radial formation where the 
USVs are arranged in a circle around the SAG. In the linear formation, the USV to SAG 
distance is applicable to the closest USV, the line forms perpendicular to that closest USV-
SAG axis. In the event of an even number of USVs, the USV to SAG distance applies to 
the closest two USVs and the line forms perpendicular to the axis formed from the SAG to 
the midpoint between the two closest USVs. In the radial formation, the USV to SAG 
distance is the same for each USV, and each USV maintains a consistent distance with each 
neighboring USV. Examples of each formation are presented in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38.  Example Linear and Radial Formations 
For the purposes of this study, the metric of interest is degrees of coverage. Degrees 
of coverage are derived from the lines of sight from the SAG drawn to the tangent of USV 
detection rings and were measured using computer tools. They are a product of the USV-
SAG distance, the USV-USV distance, the USV formation type, and USV detection ring 
radii. A formation presenting degrees of coverage over 360 is possible and denotes overlap 
in USV detection rings. 
Linear and radial formations using default input parameters were first assessed for 
one through six USVs using a spacing of 47 kilometers to eliminate gaps between the 
detection ring radii against a terminal missile. With these parameters, six USVs provide 
over 360 degrees of coverage in a radial formation. An example of linear and radial 
formations for four USVs is presented in Figure 39, in which an angled solid line shows 
the degrees of coverage against an ASCM in cruise phase, and an angled dashed line shows 
the degrees of coverage against an ASCM in its terminal phase. A summary table of degrees 
of coverage for one through six USVs is presented in Table 17. 
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Figure 39.  Examples of Degrees of Coverage 
Table 17.   Degrees of Coverage and Total USV-SAG Distance per 
Number of USVs 
 
 
The linear degrees of coverage reach diminishing returns before the 175 degree 
mark. This aligns to the natural upper bound of 180 degrees, assuming an unlimited number 
of USVs. In contrast, 360 degree coverage and beyond (denoting coverage overlaps) can 
be obtained by a radial formation. If degrees of coverage are the only metric of concern, a 
radial formation is clearly the superior option. 
Linear Formation Radial Formation
Number USVs Lin Cruise Det ° Lin Term Det ° Rad Cruise Det ° Rad Term Det ° Linear Distance Radial Distance
1 91° 62° 91° 62° 47.5 46.3
2 133° 118° 155° 124° 105.2 92.6
3 150° 134° 214° 186° 180.8 138.9
4 160° 140° 278° 248° 274.9 185.2
5 163° 152° 338° 308° 390.6 231.5
6 166° 161° 402° 372° 528.319 277.8
Degrees of Coverage Total Distance (km)
Linear Formation Radial Formation
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Figure 40 shows the evaluation of these same formations of one through six USVs 
for total distance between the USV and SAG. The benefit of a linear formation is made 
clear in terms of total USV-SAG distance. The USV-SAG distance has direct influence on 
the overall early warning time. USVs at the periphery of the linear formation provide 
additional early warning time over those in a radial formation located closer to the SAG. 
 
Figure 40.  Total USV-SAG Distance versus Number of USVs by Formation 
for Baseline Parameters 
The above relationships represent only two of many combinations of factors that 
an operational commander determining SAG formations must consider. In many cases, the 
number of USVs provided to the SAG may be non-negotiable. In the case where two or 
three are provided, given the degrees of coverage and total USV-SAG distance 
considerations, it would likely be more favorable to employ the USVs radially to increase 
degrees of coverage at marginal early detection costs. Given the ability to employ six 
USVs, the decision changes as the tradeoffs are more meaningful. 
Additional factors to consider again include the spacing of the USVs to the SAG 
and the spacing between the USVs. The above examples assumed an effective zero gap 
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between the USV detection radii against threat missiles in terminal flight profiles. 
Increasing the USV spacing could increase the overall cruise flight profile detection rings 
without increasing the number of USVs involved but at increased risk to terminal phase 
threat missiles sneaking through the screen in gapped detection zones. Follow on studies 
could further explore the tradeoffs of USV to SAG spacing, USV spacing, and alternative 
formations.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study attempted to determine whether using medium-sized USVs in support 
of a SAG will positively impact the SAG’s survivability against ASCM attacks. First, the 
systems engineering process was followed to develop a notional medium-sized USV. High 
level needs and functional requirements were determined, and component subsystems were 
then selected. Following development of the USV, two operational situations where the 
SAG was targeted by enemy ASCMs were investigated: a situation where the USV 
responded to the threat and a situation where the USV did not directly respond but provided 
early warning and threat cueing to the SAG. 
Both situations were analyzed to determine if the USV mitigated the probability of 
an ASCM hitting the SAG. The first situation was meant to examine this mitigation by way 
of the USV defeating the threats before they reached the SAG. The second situation 
examined the mitigation by way of the USV offering the SAG additional reaction time and 
counter-fire opportunities to organically respond to the ASCM. Analysis of both situations 
revealed there is clear tactical utility in using USVs to defend SAGs against ASCMs. 
Finally, the utility of different formations between USVs and the SAG was also explored. 
A. SYSTEM ENGINEERING ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
Operational requirements were derived by developing a DRM to illustrate a 
projected operational environment for the USV. It was determined that to mitigate the 
probability of an ASCM hit on the SAG, the USV needs to either defeat the threat or 
increase the SAG’s available reaction time by providing threat cueing. From these high-
level operational requirements, the need for two categories of USV subsystems was 
identified. First, detection subsystems, which were an air search radar and an ES system, 
would find and track any incoming ASCM. Second, response subsystems in the form of 
soft-kill deception countermeasures, SAMs, CIWS, and EA were needed to defeat the 
detected ASCM. Specific subsystem functional requirements were derived and formed the 
basis for selection of currently available COTS and GOTS systems. The process identified 
that multiple potential system selection outcomes are possible and chose the best systems 
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to meet the operational needs and remain within SWaP constraints imposed by the 
maximum size of a medium USV. 
B. SUBSYSTEM SELECTION 
To provide the functionality required, research was conducted to determine what 
capabilities are available currently or in the near-term that could be integrated onto a 
medium-sized USV. Additional functional requirements were derived for the USV based 
on the chosen subsystems, including communications, electrical power, cooling, 
hydraulics, positioning, navigation, and timing services. 
The specific detection and response subsystems selected were: 
1. Air search radar – Enterprise Air Search Radar Variant 2 
2. Electronic support system – Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement 
Program Block 3 
3. Soft-kill deception countermeasures – Centurion countermeasure launcher 
4. Surface-to-air missile system – Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block 2 and 
Mk 29 Guided Missile Launching System 
5. Close-in weapons system – Phalanx 
6. Radio frequency jamming (electronic attack) – Surface Electronic Warfare 
Improvement Program Block 3 
These subsystems were chosen because of their small footprint yet high level of 
capability. Because the USVs are significantly smaller than a typical warship, the 
subsystems must optimize the space available. It was also determined that communications 
requirements could be met with current communication capabilities.  
From analysis of physical attributes for each selected subsystem, the overall SWaP 
requirements were developed. These requirements were assessed against the notional 
medium-sized USV host platform characteristics including length, width, and 
displacement. This assessment concluded that the overall subsystem requirements do not 
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exceed the medium-sized USV host platform limits and that medium-sized USVs can be 
equipped with the combination of prescribed detection and response subsystems.  
C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
1. Markov Kill Chain Model 
Using a Markov kill chain, the first model presents the use of a single USV as a line 
of defense for the SAG. The USV utilizes SAMs, soft-kill deception countermeasures, EA, 
and CIWS to respond to incoming ASCM threats. The model uses a state transition diagram 
that is developed into a state machine. The state machine uses the time in each state and 
the probability of transitioning between states to determine the time until and probabilities 
for reaching one of the three final states: hard kill, soft kill, or no kill. Risk Simulator was 
used to run 5000 trials in each scenario. 
This model ran four different scenarios using a combination of OPSITs 1A and 1B 
and the medium and high threats. Scenario 2—based on OPSIT 1B with all USV response 
options available to use against the medium threat—proved to be the most effective in 
eliminating incoming threats. Scenarios 1 and 4, however, with the USV in OPSIT 1A and 
in OPSIT 1B employing only SAMs, respectively, both still proved to be highly effective 
with over 81% success rate at defeating ASCMs. 
In Scenario 3, the model shows that the USV is not provided authorization from the 
SAG in sufficient time and is therefore unable to engage the high threat at terminal speed. 
By the time the SAG issues a direction to the USV, the incoming ASCM will already have 
passed through the USV’s range rings. A good candidate for further study would be to 
determine if there is any difference when taking the man out of the loop in this scenario. 
In Scenario 4, the USV responds to OPSIT 1B with the use of Range Ring 1 only. 
When comparing the results for OPSIT 1B for use of all three range rings and the use of 
only one range ring, it is evident that soft-kill deception countermeasures, EW, and CIWS 
increase USV effectiveness in engaging incoming ASCM threats.  
While limitations of this model include that it does not take into consideration the 
limited number of SAMs available for utilization or the SAG’s ability to also engage the 
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incoming threats, the results show that the USV as a weapon platform can greatly reduce 
the incoming ASCM threats, providing a defensive advantage for the SAG. 
2. Time Series Analysis 
The utility of the USV as an early warning cueing sensor for SAG counter-fire was 
demonstrated using a time-distance analysis model created in Excel. Assessments for each 
threat missile were conducted, and the relationships of USV and SAG detection rings as a 
function of radar antenna height and USV-SAG spacing were explored. The early detection 
times for high, medium, and low threat missiles were then translated into SAG counter-fire 
shot opportunities to quantitatively demonstrate the potential early warning benefit. The 
results of this analysis show that USVs providing early warning cueing of incoming threats 
has clear benefit in the SAG’s ability to engage incoming threat missiles.  
In the assessment of the USV as an early warning cueing sensor, additional 
takeaways were realized. As antenna height on the USV increases, the detection radius of 
the USV also grows corresponding in increased early warning detection time. As such, the 
radar should be positioned as high as feasible within the limits of ship design. The more 
significant means of increasing the early warning detection time is to position the USV 
further from the SAG. Increasing the spacing between the USV and the SAG does present 
a tradeoff in the effective coverage arc, explored in the final assessment. 
3. USV Formation Analysis 
Tradeoffs in effective arc coverage were examined in the analysis of USV 
formations around the SAG using a graphical tool developed in Excel using Visual Basic 
for Applications. The tool accounted for relative USV-SAG spacing, detection rings for 
threat missiles derived from USV and SAG antenna heights, and inter-USV spacing. The 
metrics of interest include degrees of coverage in terms of the USV detection screen, and 
total linear distance between the USVs and SAG. The total linear distance corresponds to 
early warning time for SAG counter-fire. Two generic formations were evaluated, a linear 
screen where USVs formed a line perpendicular to a given threat access and a radial 
formation with even spacing around the SAG. 
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The analysis showed that as the number of USVs increased, the radial formation 
provided the best degrees of coverage. The linear formation, however, presented an 
advantage in the total linear distance and corresponding early warning detection times. In 
any case, an increase in USV-SAG spacing will result in increased early warning detection 
times but can result in reduced degrees of coverage. USV-USV spacing impacts are 
situational, but for both linear and radial formations, an increase in this spacing will 
generally also produce radar coverage gaps. Tradeoffs in these measures of interest will 
have to be considered when deciding on the USV formation with respect to the SAG. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Two broad categories were identified for further research into USV applications to 
defend SAGs against ASCMs. The first was additional research needed to complete the 
total USV system design, and the second was expanded research into realistic scenarios for 
USV operational employment. 
1. Future Study Areas in USV Design 
This study considers capabilities that exist in the present, leaving future technology 
analysis for another study. It is however assumed that the fielding of technological 
advancements in the maritime environment will progress such that the findings herein will 
still be valid should the Navy implement a USV defensive line in the coming years. 
Another area for continued research is the selection of specific subsystems 
necessary to support the detection and response subsystems, such as communications, 
electrical power, cooling, hydraulics, positioning, navigation, and timing services. In the 
conduct of this study, it was assumed these necessary services would be provided. To 
ensure a complete system design, a detailed investigation into these support subsystems 
must therefore be conducted, including a selection of specific components and 
identification of total support requirements for each subsystem.  
As a part of vessel design, development of the interior and exterior component lay-
out of the USV will then be necessary. This includes designing the USV with weight 
balance in mind. Trade-offs in vessel stability and placement of identified subsystems to 
106 
optimize tactical performance and minimize blockage zones must be considered. A future 
research project could be to perform a stability study to determine the righting moments 
and roll angles of various configurations. 
A further area that will require additional research is systems integration onboard 
the USV. Since all detection, response, and support subsystems interact with the ICS, 
integrating all these systems with the ICS is paramount. Effective tactical performance 
demands these interactions occur seamlessly. While there are currently combat systems 
that integrate each of the subsystems recommended by this study, no ICS has been designed 
to integrate with all of them together and operate on an unmanned vessel of this size. 
Similarly, as the functional requirements show, each subsystem also depends on others to 
varying degrees. Further efforts are needed to study the integration of all interfacing 
systems. 
Adversaries may also be able to pinpoint and exploit weaknesses in an unmanned 
systems’ command and control system, giving the adversaries the ability to misdirect the 
USV and cause defensive gaps for friendly units. Cybersecurity for all USV systems is a 
critical design area for further research. 
2. Future Study Areas in USV Operational Employment 
Large numbers of USVs could be used to create an expansive common tactical 
picture covering thousands of square miles. While some studies have considered the 
problem of the robustness of smaller networks, a very large network compounding said 
problem would be a good candidate for future study. 
It is also likely the USV will be deployed to regions where adversaries can contest 
the electromagnetic environment. As this study found, the benefits of this vessel are not 
fully realized unless it is networked into the common tactical picture collectively produced 
by friendly forces in the area. Anti-jamming capabilities should be explored to ensure the 
USV can participate in the tactical picture network. 
Another important method of adapting to the expected contested electromagnetic 
environment are emissions control procedures. By securing equipment operating on certain 
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portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, military units can avoid being identified as a U.S. 
or friendly military unit or even avoid being passively detected altogether. With respect to 
the USV, further studies should be conducted to develop emissions control procedures such 
that its systems can quickly be de-energized (and re-energized) by remote command. 
This study examined three particular threats with a wide variation in range, speed, 
and explosive yield between them. Of course, there are many types of ASCMs employed 
around the world, with still more in development. Further examination of these threats is 
necessary to thoroughly assess the utility of medium-sized USVs as an ASCM defense 
option. 
Future explorations for modeling could include situations where the USV fires 
multiple SAMs, either at a single threat based on doctrine or based on necessity when there 
are multiple incoming ASCMs. This research would determine at what point the USV will 
become ineffective as a defensive measure against a raid of ASCM threats due to depletion 
of missile inventory or oversaturation of threats. Additionally, it would be worthwhile for 
a study to investigate the effects of multiple USVs engaging incoming threats. This would 
further explore the benefits of having different geometries with various numbers of USVs 
in the path of the incoming ASCMs. 
Finally, as USVs prove to be tactically beneficial, our adversaries will notice and 
respond accordingly. As the USVs will likely be targeted directly by the threat missiles, 
future studies will need to be conducted to explore USV self-defense capabilities. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Air Search Radar 
• The radar system shall fit within the footprint of the medium-sized USV. 
• The radar system shall be capable of disregarding returns not meeting COI 
classification. 
• The radar system shall be capable of remote configuration updates such as COI 
parameters, threat profiles, cued search areas, no transmission areas, power levels, 
and the like. 
• The radar system shall be capable of large-scale search functionality and high-
resolution tracking. This may be accomplished by one or multiple air search 
radars. 
• The radar system shall automatically designate track COIs meeting pre-assigned 
parameters. 
• The radar system shall fix the location of COIs. 
• The radar system shall track the movement and path of COIs. 
• The radar system shall not interfere with other radars, including USV navigation 
radars or response subsystem radars. 
• The radar system shall provide target track data to the ICS for further 
transmission to the SAG. 
Electronic Support 
• The electronic support system shall fit within the footprint of the medium-sized 
USV. 
• The electronic support system shall be capable of detecting threat missiles in their 
expected emitter operating frequency bands. 
• The electronic support system shall process detection data onboard the USV, to 
include the threat emitter, line of bearing information, and signal strength. 
• The electronic support system shall automatically designate COIs meeting pre-
assigned parameters. 
• The electronic support system shall provide all detection data for COIs to the ICS 
for further transmission to the SAG. 
• The electronic support system shall provide high elevation angle coverage. 
• The electronic support system shall isolate own ship emitters. 
• The electronic support system shall be capable of remote configuration including 
threat profiles and cued search bearings or areas. 
Soft-Kill Deception Countermeasures 
• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall fit within the footprint of the 
medium-sized USV. 
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• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall be capable of launching 
either chaff or flare countermeasure payloads. 
• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall be capable of launching 
countermeasure rounds in use by the USN or Allied forces. 
• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall be capable of providing 
health and status messages to the ICS, including round inventory information. 
• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall be capable of providing 
launch event status messages indicating status of countermeasure launches. 
• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall be capable of receiving 
launch commands, ASCM track and ES signature data from the ICS. 
• The soft-kill deception countermeasure system shall be capable of receiving 
automatic launch parameter updates from the SAG via the ICS. 
Surface-to-Air Missiles 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall fit within the footprint of the medium-
sized USV. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall be capable of launch from a launcher 
employed on the USV. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall be capable of receiving guidance 
information from the USV and the SAG. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall be capable of in-flight maneuvering and 
speed required to address threat ASCM targets. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall be capable of receiving in-flight target 
updates. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall be equipped with an infrared seeker at a 
minimum to enable target engagement. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall be capable of receiving launch orders from 
the ICS. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall integrate with the ICS to be capable of 
receiving weapons posture and engagement configuration updates from the SAG. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall use a single variant of SAM. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall enable the USV to auto-fire SAMs on 
incoming ASCM threats. 
• The surface-to-air missile system shall generate and provide the ICS and SAG 
general health and status messages and launch event reports. 
Close-in Weapons System 
• The close-in weapons system shall fit within the footprint of the medium-sized 
USV. 
• The close-in weapons system shall have a detection and engagement range of at 
least 3.7 kilometers (2 nautical miles). 
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• The close-in weapons system shall be capable of receiving track hand-off from 
the ICS. 
• The close-in weapons system shall be capable of automatically detecting ASCMs. 
• The close-in weapons system shall automatically fire when a threat is detected, is 
in range, and meets the engagement criteria. 
• The close-in weapons system shall automatically cease firing when it no longer 
detects the threat, has detected the elimination of the threat, detects the threat is 
outbound or outside engagement range, or to prevent accidental engagement of 
blue forces. 
• The close-in weapons system shall be capable of firing rounds in use by the USN 
or Allied forces. 
• The close-in weapons system shall be compatible with a centralized cooling 
system to cool system electronics. 
• The close-in weapons system shall generate and provide the ICS health and status 
messages and firing event status messages indicating engagement events. 
• The close-in weapons system shall be capable of remote configuration including 
engagement settings and threat profiles. 
Electronic Attack 
• The electronic attack system shall fit within the footprint of the medium-sized 
USV. 
• The electronic attack system shall be capable of receiving engagement cueing 
from the ICS. 
• The electronic attack system shall automatically begin emitting when a threat is 
detected, is in range, and meets engagement criteria. 
• The electronic attack system shall automatically cease emitting when it no longer 
detects the threat, has detected the elimination of the threat, detects the threat is 
outside engagement parameters, or to prevent mutual interference with other blue 
forces. 
• The electronic attack system shall be compatible with a centralized cooling 
system to cool system electronics. 
• The electronic attack system shall be able to provide health and status messages 
and firing event status messages indicating engagement events. 
• The electronic attack system shall be capable of remote configuration including 
engagement settings and threat profiles. 
Integrated Combat System 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of passing ASCM track and ES 
signature data to the deception countermeasure, SAM, CIWS, and EA systems. 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of commanding deception 
countermeasure launches and SAM launches and specifying payload type to 
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launch for either subsystem, to include commanding other USV subsystems to 
provide information or services as required. 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of commanding EA subsystem 
engagement against an ASCM target, to include commanding other USV 
subsystems to provide information or services as required. 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of receiving and disseminating (to 
the SAG) health and status reports from the air search radar, ES, deception 
countermeasure, SAM, CIWS, and EA subsystems, or any other subsystem 
integrated with the ICS. 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of receiving and disseminating (to 
the SAG) launch or emit reports from the deception countermeasure, SAM, 
CIWS, and EA subsystems. 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of receiving remote configuration 
updates from the SAG and applying them to applicable subsystems. These include 
rules of engagement settings and threat profiles for all USV subsystems. 
• The integrated combat system shall merge contact data from the air search radar 
and ES systems. 
• The integrated combat system shall interface with the off-hull communications 
subsystems. 
• The integrated combat system shall leverage a common architecture like the 
Common Object Request Broker Architecture or similar. 
• The integrated combat system shall be capable of directing the positioning, 
navigation, and timing system to ignore COLREGs, UNCLOS, or other 
international agreements as necessary and proceed as tactically directed when the 
operational situation warrants. 
Electrical Power System 
• The electrical power system shall provide enough power to support all onboard 
systems. 
• The electrical power system shall generate and distribute power at 450 volts 
alternating current at 60 hertz in 3-phase and in single-phase for use by requisite 
440 volt rated systems and for transformation down to 120 volts. 
• The electrical power system shall use transformers to generate and distribute 
power at 120 volts alternating current at 60 hertz in 3-phase and in single-phase 
for use by requisite 115 volt rated systems. 
• The electrical power system shall use frequency converters to generate power at 
115 volts alternating current at 400 hertz and in 3-phase and shall distribute that 
power as necessary. 
• The electrical power system shall comply with safety design requirements set 
forth in Naval Ship’s Technical Manual Chapter 300. 
• The electrical power system shall be capable of self-monitoring for potential and 
confirmed system faults. 
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• The electrical power system shall send periodic system health and status messages 
to the ICS for further transmission to the SAG. 
• The electrical power system shall be capable of autonomously initiating 
procedures to maintain USV equipment in the event of electrical problems, such 
as isolation, generator shutdown, and load-shed procedures. 
Cooling System 
• The cooling system shall have separate chill water and seawater cooling 
capabilities. 
• The cooling system shall use seawater to cool systems able to withstand high 
amounts of heat. 
• The cooling system shall use chill water to cool systems sensitive to changes in 
heat. 
Hydraulics System 
• The hydraulics system shall use an automated control system. 
• The hydraulics system shall move hydraulic oil to open or close hydraulic 
operated valves and move machinery parts as necessary. 
• The hydraulics system shall be capable of receiving and responding to direction 
from the ICS to open or close valves or move machinery in order to properly 
employ combat systems. 
• The hydraulics system shall generate and provide the ICS and SAG general health 
and status messages, to include hydraulic oil tank levels and reports on any 
detected hydraulic oil leaks. 
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing System 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall comply with Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6130.01, the Department of Defense Master 
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall operate with Department of 
Defense approved positioning, navigation, and timing equipment. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall accurately and precisely 
determine USV location three-dimensionally, referenced to World Geodetic 
System 1984. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall use an inertial navigation 
system capable of determining position absent GPS input in case of GPS denial. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall provide for effective and 
safe navigation in accordance with COLREGs and other international agreements, 
such as UNCLOS, unless overridden by the ICS due to tactical considerations. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall apply course and speed 
corrections to attain position and maintain station as directed by the SAG via the 
ICS. 
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• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall determine and maintain 
Coordinated Universal Time and be capable of converting the time to any time 
zone specified by SAG operators via the ICS. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall be resistant to jamming. 
• The positioning, navigation, and timing system shall interact with the ICS to pass 
positioning, navigation, and timing data to all combat systems and to receive 
maneuvering directions and override orders to ignore COLREGs or UNCLOS if 
needed. 
General Subsystem Requirements 
Environmental 
• The system shall be rugged in accordance with MIL-STD-810G for shock, 
vibration, and saltwater environments. 
• The system shall be capable of operating in air temperatures from 0–50 degrees 
Celsius. 




APPENDIX B: MARKOV KILL CHAIN STATE MACHINES 
Tables 18 through 20 show the state machines used in the Markov kill chain 
analysis. Table 18 shows the state machine for Scenario 1, corresponding to OPSIT 1A. 
Table 19 shows the state machine for Scenario 2 and Scenario 3, corresponding to OPSIT 
1B. Finally, Table 20 shows the state machine for Scenario 4, corresponding to OPSIT 1B 
without Range Ring 2 and Range Ring 3. The current state is represented by each row, and 
the state names are shown in the column on the far left. The states to be transitioned to are 
represented by the following columns and are named across the top of the tables. The values 
inside each cell are the probabilities for transitioning from the state identified by the cell’s 
particular row to the state identified by the cell’s particular column. Therefore, when 
viewing the tables, the value in the cell where the current state under investigation and the 
desired transition state intersect denotes the probability for that transition to occur. For 
example, based on the value at the intersection of the Identify row and the Track Shared 
column, Table 18 shows that the probability for transitioning from Identify to Track Shared 
is 0.95. To further aid in understanding, it is recommended to view these tables with Figure 
25, the state transition diagram.
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Table 18.   State Machine for Scenario 1—Based on OPSIT 1A 
 
 


























Hard Kill Soft Kill No Kill
P S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20
Search S1 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
Detect S2 0.01 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track S3 0.01 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identify S4 0.05 0 0 0 0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track Shared S5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Networked TEWA S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAG Response S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.25 0.15
Determine Response S8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR1 S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR1 Engagement S10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.82 0 0.18
Respond RR2 S11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR2 Engagement S12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR3 S13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR3 Engagement S14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR2 Backhalf S15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR2 Backhalf Engagement S16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR1 Backhalf S17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hard Kill S18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Soft Kill S19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
No Kill S20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Table 19.   State Machine for Scenarios 2 and 3—Based on OPSIT 1B 
 
 


























Hard Kill Soft Kill No Kill
P S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20
Search S1 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
Detect S2 0.01 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track S3 0.01 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identify S4 0.05 0 0 0 0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track Shared S5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Networked TEWA S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAG Response S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.25 0.15
Determine Response S8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR1 S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR1 Engagement S10 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.82 0 0
Respond RR2 S11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR2 Engagement S12 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0
Respond RR3 S13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR3 Engagement S14 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 0.2 0.1 0
Respond RR2 Backhalf S15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Assess RR2 Backhalf Engagement S16 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 0 0.2 0
Respond RR1 Backhalf S17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.82 0 0.18
Hard Kill S18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Soft Kill S19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
No Kill S20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Table 20.   State Machine for Scenario 4—Based on OPSIT 1B with Range Ring 1 Engagements Only 
 
 


























Hard Kill Soft Kill No Kill
P S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 S19 S20
Search S1 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01
Detect S2 0.01 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track S3 0.01 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Identify S4 0.05 0 0 0 0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Track Shared S5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Networked TEWA S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAG Response S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.25 0.15
Determine Response S8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR1 S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR1 Engagement S10 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.82 0 0
Respond RR2 S11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR2 Engagement S12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR3 S13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR3 Engagement S14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR2 Backhalf S15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assess RR2 Backhalf Engagement S16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Respond RR1 Backhalf S17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.82 0 0.18
Hard Kill S18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Soft Kill S19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
No Kill S20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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